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1 INTRODUCTION 
On January 7th 2015, two Muslim men attacked the office of the satirical magazine Charlie 
Hebdo in Paris, France. This weekly newspaper is known for its satirical cartoons, saving 
no one – especially not religions – from its sharp irony and snide jokes. Over the years, it 
has published several cartoons presenting the Prophet Muhammad or other important 
Muslim figures in a rather compromising way. There can be many opinions about the 
tastefulness or discretion of these cartoons, and obviously they have not been that 
welcomed  within  the  Muslim  community  where  the  sublime  status  of  the  Prophet  
Muhammad cannot be denied.  
Nevertheless, these cartoons might have been the trigger for the two young men to commit 
the terrorist attack in the office of Charlie Hebdo and taking lives of 12 people. This 
incident has raised similar attention and debates as the cartoons portraying the Prophet 
Muhammad published in the Danish Jyllands-Posten newspaper in 2005 – Once again 
Islam is depicted as an opposing power to the European Western culture and its values, in 
this  case  specifically  as  a  threat  to  the  highly  valued  freedom  of  speech.  One  comment  
strongly highlighting this point of view was stated by the Chairman for the Council for 
Mass Media in Finland, Risto Uimonen, arguing that this terrorist attack is a clear indicator 
of “how hard it is to combine the Western and Islamic understanding of freedom of speech 
and democracy”.1  
The media coverage on the subject has mostly highlighted these above-mentioned matters, 
but some have had the courage to question this interpretation of the attack and argued for 
instance, how imperative it is to “resist the clash-of-civilizations narrative”.2 Others have 
                                               
1 Outi Salovaara, Helsingin Sanomat, 
http://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/a1420611358692?jako=ae21a3177ffcc35edb1207331215a19e (accessed Jan. 8, 
2015). 
2 Homa Khaleeli, The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/07/charlie-hebdo-
clash-civilisation-terrorism-muslims?CMP=twt_gu (accessed Jan. 8, 2015). “The Clash of Civilizations” 
thesis was introduced by Samuel Huntington in his work The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of 
World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). His argument is based on the perceived confrontation 
between the West and Islam. Some journalists frequently use Huntington’s concept - and as a matter of fact, 
so do some Arabs and Muslims themselves, as well – even though it has been largely contested among many 
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claimed that Muslim leaders around the world should condemn the attack,3 while still 
others have emphasized that Muslims definitely have no obligation to condemn it4 and, in 
fact, this consideration can even be suggested as being Islamophobic.5 In addition, there 
have been worried questions of the possible negative outcome of the attack for the Muslim 
communities and the public discussion around it – will the polarized situation between 
Islam  and  the  West  continue  to  worsen6 and will these events, in fact, only enhance the 
power of extremist ideologies of both sides of the arguments.7  
For the past year or so there has been an ongoing public discussion not only in Finland, but 
also in the worldwide media, concerning the issues of the radicalization of youth, Islam 
and Muslims, Islamist movements, jihadi terrorism and the flow of foreign fighters to Syria 
and Iraq. The media coverage on the subject has been intense and it has raised many 
worried questions in newspapers, blogs, social media and Internet discussion forums. This 
media visibility has on the one hand given valuable information on the subject and thus 
forced the authorities to act upon it, but on the other hand it seems that it might have 
created a more hostile atmosphere towards Islam and Muslims. If this is the case, there is a 
danger that the situation can worsen and feed populist, xenophobic and oversimplified 
opinions, hence ultimately maintaining and enhancing the perspective of Islam as the 
other. 
As I have been following this media hype, I realized that it is quite difficult to find a 
Muslim authority point of view to this subject, especially in Finland. There are plenty of 
articles  on  the  flux  of  foreign  fighters  to  Syria  or  the  problematic  issue  of  radicalization  
                                                                                                                                              
academics as being a dangerous oversimplification because it contributes to the division between “us” and 
“them” (Goerzig and Al-Hashimi 2015, 112; 118).   
3 Staff writer, Al Arabiya News, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/world/2015/01/08/Muslim-unions-
leaders-condemn-barbaric-Paris-attack-.html (accessed Jan. 8, 2015). 
4 Mark Steel, The Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/charlie-hebdo-how-exactly-
would-we-like-muslims-to-condemn-these-attacks-9966176.html (accessed Jan. 8, 2015). 
5 Max Fisher, Vox, http://www.vox.com/2014/12/15/7394223/muslims-condemn-charlie-hebdo (accessed 
Jan. 8, 2015). 
6 Petja Pelli, Helsingin Sanomat, 
http://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/a1420697266034?jako=c4471059f49b1d0b537de05e6066787b (accessed Jan. 9, 
2015); Elisa Kallunki, Yle Uutiset, 
http://yle.fi/uutiset/terrorismitutkijan_huoli_islaminvastaisuus_kasvaa/7725348 (accessed Jan. 8, 2015).  
7 Minna Nalbantoglu, Helsingin Sanomat, http://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/a1420697193719 (accessed Jan. 9, 
2015); Petja Pelli, Helsingin Sanomat, http://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/a1305915184499 (accessed Jan. 8, 2015); 
Tariq Ramadan, The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/09/paris-hijackers-
hijacked-islam-no-war-between-islam-west (accessed Jan. 9, 2015); Kate Connolly and Angelique Chrisafis 
and Stephanie Kirchgaessner, The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/09/muslims-
europe-fear-escalation-anti-islamism-paris-attacks (accessed Jan. 9, 2015). 
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and its prevention, most of them written by journalists, researchers and experts. Several of 
these comments highlight the importance of the local Muslim community to work on this 
issue. However at the same time, we are missing out on the insights, initiatives and ideas of 
local Muslims authorities themselves: How do they feel about this phenomenon of 
radicalization? Does it worry them, or do they feel that the whole issue is exaggerated? Do 
they feel that the root cause of this problem lies in religion, or has it been religionized? 
What will they do about the situation, what should be done by the local authorities? The 
list of questions I would like to pose the local Muslim community authorities is extensive 
and the lack of Muslim perspective in media coverage suggests that the representation of 
the situation is not completely equal. 
Coming from this perspective, I decided to focus my research on the phenomenon of 
radicalization within the Muslim communities in the Helsinki metropolitan area, by 
specifically providing the viewpoints and insights of the local Muslim community 
authorities, such as the imams and other Muslims who are in influential positions within 
their communities. The choice of study subject is supported by the fact that leaders and 
authorities of religious communities are generally in an influential position within their 
group. Thus they usually possess a large amount of valuable information concerning the 
uncertainties, anxieties and activities of the members of their community. In addition, 
religious leaders are often approached by their members with every-day issues and 
especially members with migrant background might turn to seek support due to the low 
threshold compared to distant governmental officials. (IOM 2011) 
 
1.1 Starting the research process 
The first steps of this research were made when trying to decide on the topic of the whole 
study and the points of view from which the issue will be studied. It all started in summer 
2014 as I was scanning through the ongoing discussions about Islam in the Finnish media. 
I became curious and started to study the subject more intensively, finally reaching the 
decision to focus this study on radicalization within the Islamic context. At the same time 
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things were heating up in the media, and the amount of headlines and news articles I 
encountered started to intensify. This inevitably made me increasingly interested in 
researching the whole issue and I started to dig deeper.  
When going through the vast written material and studies on the subject and pondering 
how to collect the material for this study, I already started narrowing down the main focus. 
The aim was to reflect on those concepts, elements and theories, which are relevant to this 
study and to find out more about the subject. This is when I realized that, as the resources 
of a Master’s thesis are limited, the most reasonable way to narrow down the research 
question would be to focus on Muslim communities present in the Helsinki metropolitan 
area (Helsinki, Espoo, and Vantaa).  
What  then  followed  was  an  extensive  and  thorough  familiarization  with  the  spectrum  of  
Muslim communities present in this geographical area. This part of the study took 
surprisingly much time, because the number of communities is definitely not easy to grasp. 
There  are  not  just  a  vast  number  of  communities,  but  also  the  information  about  them is  
scattered around the Internet, and it is highly outdated. 
 
1.2 Theoretical framework and previous research 
In this study I am approaching the chosen subject and research questions from a 
multidisciplinary perspective. The previous research and theories are mostly from the 
fields  of  Terrorism  Studies,  Middle  Eastern  Studies,  Political  Science,  Sociology,  Social  
Psychology, Islamic Studies and the Sociology of Religion.  
This chapter presents the ways in which radicalization has been studied within the 
academic context. The following subchapters demonstrate the different ways of defining 
the terms ‘radical’ and ‘radicalization’, and expose their definitions in the context of this 
research. 
5 
 
 
 
 
1.2.1 Studying radicalization 
These  days  the  study  of  radicalization  tends  to  focus  more  on  understanding  the  
phenomenon, whereas it used to concentrate on the explanatory by producing reasons why 
radicalization takes place in the first place. Before it was all about explaining which kind 
of individual characteristics or structural factors are the ones that create radicalization, 
when nowadays the research highlights the importance of understanding the dynamics 
between these two and hence the process nature of radicalization. Even if it is 
indispensable to study which matters eventually lead to radicalization, the findings remain 
limited and the situation unclarified (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi 2015, 8). As sociologist, Orla 
Lynch (2013, 241) puts it when discussing radicalization as a term: it is “conceptually and 
chronologically immature”.  
Magnus  Ranstorp,  a  scholar  of  Terrorism  Studies,  highlights  the  fact  that  radicalization  
processes are complex and cannot be defined as a linear progression (2010, 2). It is 
problematic to approach these processes due to their context dependency. Even though 
there are common elements, the processes and circumstances facilitating radicalization can 
be different depending on the regional conditions and the historical and social context. 
Political scientist, Angel Rabasa, and sociologist, Cheryl Benard, continue by stating that, 
in fact, extremism and radicalism are built-in elements of all societies (2014, 3).  
 
The interest in studying radicalization has been ever-increasing after the 9/11. This hype 
has produced several different kinds of studies approaching the phenomenon from many 
different angles (Ranstrop 2010, Lynch 2013).  Some academic studies have focused, for 
example on researching the patterns and processes of extremist recruitment in Europe as an 
effort to understand the extremist setting and the socio-psychological recruit profiles 
(Taarnby 2005).When others, such as Peter Nesser (2006, 31–49), a scholar of Terrorism 
Studies, have studied terrorist cells and sought to categorize the distinct roles within them. 
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Some scholars have made studies in content analysis and on the religious components of 
the phenomenon (Larson 2006, 197–215), while others have sought to offer a more 
theoretically oriented research on the radicalization recruitment and processes by 
employing a social movement theory (Wiktorowitcz 2005). Moreover, the academic 
studies of Jeff Victoroff and John Horgan have focused on the group dynamics and 
engagement within the terrorist groups as well as on the psychological approaches (Horgan 
2006, 106–126; Victoroff 2005, 3–42). 
There are also studies focused on the role of prisons as a radicalization milieu (Ranstorp 
2010,  3)  or  of  the  Internet  in  the  radicalization  processes  and  recruitment.  For  example,  
Ranstorp’s (2007) research, shedding light on the relationship between the operational 
playground of Internet and the ideology as a means of “psychological warfare”. In 
addition, the research of Brynjar (2006) emphasizes on the role of Internet for extremists as 
a  new  forum  to  build  relationships  and  share  discussions.  This  same  notion  has  been  
emphasized by Rabasa and Benard (2014, 117; 120) who argue that, in fact, the Internet 
can be seen nowadays as enabling terrorism in the first place. It serves as a platform for the 
practice of extremist activities, for example in the form of jihadist blogs and websites. The 
Internet has even offered the opportunity for female activists to engage in extremist 
activities and socialize with their male counterparts without breaking any religious or 
cultural moral codes.  
According to Carolin Goerzig, a scholar of Terrorism Studies, and Khaled Al-Hashimi, an 
expert on conflict prone regions of Africa and the Middle East, even if there is a common 
assumption that strong religiosity is the determining factor behind radicalization; the facts 
speak of the contrary. Instead they claim that, in fact, genuine dedication to religion does 
not automatically signify radical mindset and as a matter of fact, the real problem lies in 
the  lack  of  knowledge  about  the  true  nature  and  teachings  of  their  religion.  Another  
argument referring to why radicalization of Muslims takes place is blaming the racism, 
discrimination and stigmatization Muslims encounter in the Western societies. However, 
this raises the question why others who face the same prejudices do not radicalize? 
(Goerzig & Al-Hashimi 2015, 44–47) 
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1.2.2 Finnish studies on radicalization 
Even though Finland has so far been able to avoid all large-scale terrorist attacks8, there is 
still a significant interest to study terrorism and political violence within the Finnish 
academia9.  However,  the  research  efforts  tackling  radicalization  as  a  phenomenon  in  the  
Finnish context remain relatively intact (for exceptions, see e.g; Kullberg 2011, 250–295; 
and the studies of Juha Saarinen, see footnote on p.62). Therefore, this thesis will hopefully 
contribute in providing viewpoints on domestic radicalization and inspiring further 
research on the subject.  
 
1.2.3 The trouble of definitions  
There  are  several  challenges  when  it  comes  to  defining  the  terms  radical and 
radicalization. It is imperative to consider carefully the definition of the terms as they can 
get various meanings and connotations in the minds of different people (Dalgaard-Nielsen 
2010, 797–814). In addition, what some consider as radical behavior or thoughts is 
probably not considered radical at all by the proponents of this cause (Mandel 2009, 105). 
Thus,  in  the  words  of  a  scholar  of  Terrorism  Studies  and  Political  Violence,  Peter  
Neumann (2003, 878): “For many, in other words, radicalization, like terrorism, is in the 
eye of the beholder: one man’s radical (or terrorist) is another man’s freedom fighter.”  
The difficulties in understanding the terms and the lack of a global consensus in their 
definition have led to the confusing situation where many labelling terms are being used in 
an oversimplified manner to designate an individual arrested on terrorism. In the media this 
                                               
8 If we ought to exclude the domestic school shootings of Jokela (2007) and Kauhajoki (2008), as well as the 
bomb incident in the shopping center of Myyrmanni (2002). Leena Malkki (2011, 207) accentuates that in 
terms of some of their characteristics, these events could be seen in the realm of terrorism. However, the 
Finnish public discussion, as well as official statistics, both maintain the idea of these incidents as non-
terrorism, and hence the official amount of terrorism attacks in Finland continues to be zero. 
9 See e.g. the extensive studies of Leena Malkki (e.g. 2007, 2010, 2011), Jarno Limnéll (e.g. 2011, 2012), 
Anssi Kullberg (e.g. 2006, 2011, 2014); and the various studies conducted within the Police University 
College (e.g. 2009, 2010) and the National Defence University (e.g. 2014). 
 
8 
 
 
 
individual  might  be  referred  to  as  a  Muslim fundamentalist, Islamic radical, jihadist, 
Islamic terrorist, extremist etc., while these terms certainly do not have the same meaning. 
This tendency to randomly identify a person under these labels creates confusion for not 
only the public but also to the researchers, security services and governments. The 
situation adds up to the unsettled matter of where to draw the line between only 
sympathizing with radical activities and radical activity per se, eventually culminating into 
a surveillance society where this uncertainty is used as a tool to profile a whole population. 
(Goerzig & Al-Hashimi 2015, 29) 
 
1.2.4 Defining radical and radicalization 
Radical as a concept has developed from its original meaning: initially it was used to 
describe the fundamental nature of an entity, whereas nowadays it is seen as something 
extreme in relation to the politically or socially moderate. In fact, this antonymous relation 
between the terms radical and moderate is more and more accentuated in the public 
discourse these days, which becomes visible when thinking of the prevalent discourse 
around moderate vs. radical Islam. (Mandel 2009, 104) 
What does it mean then to become radical? Does the process of radicalization ultimately 
lead to radical action or can it turn out as only radical thoughts and beliefs? Several 
academics  have  given  their  insights  on  this  matter.  Some  want  to  highlight  the  fact  that  
radical thoughts and radical actions are related, when others underline that violence is not 
automatically the outcome of a radicalization process (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi 2015, 28–
29; Mandel 2009, 102). Peter Neumann (2003) has sketched a clear division for radical 
thinking  and  radical  action.  He  defines  the  process  which  leads  to  extremist  beliefs  and  
ideas as cognitive radicalization and process leading to extremist behavior as behavioral 
radicalization. Moreover, Neumann sums up the whole radicalization process as “what 
goes on before the bomb goes off” (2008, 4 cited in Mandel 2009, 102). 
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Rabasa and Benard (2014, 3–4), however, define radicalization in terms of rejection of the 
fundamental European values (such as human rights and democracy, freedom of worship, 
gender equality and respect for diversity). They continue by stating that the trajectory of 
radicalization inaugurate from feelings of alienation and discontent resulting in the search 
for a relevant identity and friendship, which radical extremist groups willingly provide.   
 
1.2.5 The term radicalization in this study 
The definitions of the terms radical and radicalization per se,  are free from all  religious,  
political  and  ethnic  connotations,  because  the  essence  of  these  terms  is  present  in  all  
aspects of life. The term cannot as such be labeled as being either good or bad, and hence 
the objective of this study is neither to stigmatize any radical intellects of any community, 
nor to create rough generalizations on the matter. Instead this research aims to increase 
understanding of the phenomenon.  
Nevertheless, in academic research the use of terminology of the radicalization 
phenomenon needs to be placed in the context of the provided research problem. Thus 
within this study, the definition of the term radical in general terms, is influenced by the 
ideas  of  a  scholar  of  Defence  Research,  David  R.  Mandel.  According  to  his  studies,  the  
definition of the term radical is strongly dependent on the perspective. The definition 
depends on what it is related to and thus: “to be radical is to be extreme relative to 
something”. Whereas, the term radicalization can be defined as a process which leads 
individuals to turn radical. (Mandel 2009, 105–107) 
In the Islamic context of this study, I will employ the definition of radicalization presented 
by Goerzig and Al-Hashimi (2015, 30–31). They define radicalization in their study as “the 
process of progressively adopting more radical beliefs and ideas of Islam”. In their 
research, they see radicalization as a process, where the person and the situation are 
interacting: “Understanding radicalization as a process enables an analytical focus not only 
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on the environment permissive to radicalization but also the individual subject to 
radicalization”.  
 
1.2.6 Research questions 
The  purpose  of  this  research  is  to  study  the  radicalization  phenomenon  from  the  
perspectives of the Muslim communities residing in Helsinki metropolitan area. 
Additionally, the focus is on shedding light on the complex nature of the phenomenon by 
providing the aspects and elements present in defining its essence within the Finnish 
Islamic context. The research problem of this thesis has been developing throughout the 
study process, starting from the extensive studying of the pervasive media sources 
revolving around the radicalization phenomenon, and ultimately concluding in analysing 
the research data. Finally the research problem of this study is concentrated on the fact that 
several Finnish Muslims have left Finland to the conflict zones of Syria and Iraq. The aim 
of this study is to contribute to the assessment of this problem by providing Muslim 
authority viewpoints concerning this matter. 
The research questions are as follows: 
a. Which factors/elements are present when defining the radicalization phenomenon 
within an Islamic context?  
b. How is the radicalization phenomenon perceived in the Muslim communities of the 
Helsinki metropolitan area?  
c. How should the radicalization phenomenon be dealt with from the perspectives of 
the Muslim communities residing in the Helsinki metropolitan area? 
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2 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
2.1 The narrative of Islam vs. the West 
The president of the United States, Barack Obama, stated that: “the notion that the West is 
at war with Islam is an ugly lie”10 in his speech in the White House Summit on Countering 
Violent Extremism, on February 19 2015. Nevertheless, it seems that not all Muslim 
communities can unconditionally agree with him. 
The notion of Islam and the West as polarized and opposing each other sits tightly in the 
narratives and discourses of proponents from both ends. According to a Pew Global 
Attitudes survey from July 2011, the general opinion of Westerners and Muslims towards 
each other remains mainly negative. Westerners continue to hold on to the stereotypical 
images of Muslims as violent and fanatical, whereas Muslims see people from the West as 
“selfish, immoral and greedy – as well as violent and fanatical”.11 
This debate on values, attitudes and common stereotypes would be an interesting research 
topic already, but since it is not the main pursuit of this particular thesis it will be given 
less  attention  in  this  research.  However,  due  to  the  nature  of  the  research  results  of  this  
study, it is necessary to shed some light on this polarized phenomenon.  
 
                                               
10 Remarks by the President at the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism | February 19, 2015 
(https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/19/remarks-president-summit-countering-violent-
extremism-february-19-2015) (accessed Oct 20, 2015) 
11 Muslim-Western Tensions Persist: Common Concerns About Islamic Extremism 
(http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/07/21/muslim-western-tensions-persist/) (accessed Oct 20, 2015) 
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2.1.1 “Islam’s encounter with the West is as old as Islam itself”12 
According to the Palestinian American literary theorist and public intellectual Edward W. 
Said, ever since the era of the classical antiquity the Orient, and especially the Middle East, 
became known as the counterpoint to the West. This was due to historical reasons such as 
the  influence  of  the  Bible  and  the  rise  of  Christianity;  the  tales  of  the  adventures  of  
merchant travelers such as Marco Polo; Islam and its warlike pilgrims; and finally the 
Crusaders.  Said  proposes  that  the  stories  told  and  written  on  these  events  have  in  a  way 
created the stereotypes and polemical writings which have most influenced the Western 
view of the East, i.e. the Orient. (Said 2011, 63)  
Said argues that the fear of Islam, however, is deeply rooted in the European state of mind 
and world view. Its history can be traced all the way back to the aftermath of the victorious 
conquests of Muslims troops soon after the death of Prophet Muhammad in 632. The 
expansion of the military, cultural and religious hegemony of Islam comprised territories 
extending from the Mediterranean area (such as Spain, Sicily, North Africa, and Turkey) 
ultimately to India, Indonesia and China. (Said 2011, 63–64) 
The Iberian Peninsula was eventually brought back under Christian rulers, during the so-
called Reconquista, but Europe still became permanently traumatized by Islam. Until the 
end of the 1600’s, Islam, and the destruction brought by the Ottoman Empire, represented 
in the European minds a constant threat for Europe and the Christian world, which 
eventually paved the way for the image of Islam as a symbol for destruction, terror and 
barbarian ways. (Said 2011, 64) 
The illusions, stereotypes and misunderstandings around Islam formed an unbroken entity 
of  thoughts.  Already  in  the  early  Middle  Ages  Islam  was  seen  as  a  twisted  form  of  
Christianity, and the character of Muhammad was connected to different kinds of bad 
habits, such as overindulgence and lechery, because he was understood as the propagator 
of false revelation and heterodoxy. Consequently, by the beginning of the Middle Ages, the 
European civilization was ready to perceive Islam as the other. (Said 2011, 63; 65–66; 74) 
                                               
12 This quote is from the French scholar of contemporary Islam, Olivier Roy. (Roy 2007, vii) 
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2.1.2 The Afghan mujahideens and the development of the phenomenon in the 1990s 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 prompted the transnational Islamic networks to 
call jihad against the Soviets. This call was answered throughout the Muslim world by 
sympathetic Muslims inspired by its religious dimension. The jihadists’ mission was 
supported by the United States since it was in-line with its own supremacy efforts, and in 
February 1989 the Soviets withdrew its troops. The importance of the Afghan experience in 
developing the overall jihadist movement is significant, because it produced a “discourse, 
mythology and symbolic universe” around the militant Islamist campaign, which still has 
its effect in the phenomenon. Those Muslims who fought the jihad in Afghanistan, the 
veteran mujahideens, formed close networks of professional jihadists and created 
organizational structures (such as the al-Qaeda), which ultimately shaped the global 
jihadist movements evolution. (Hegghammer 2010, 24–100) 
The French scholar of contemporary Islam, Olivier Roy, argues in his book Globalized 
Islam – The search for a new ummah (London: Hurst, 2004) that it was not until the early 
1990’s when the openly anti-Western attitudes started to appear in the sphere of the Islamic 
networks. He argues that this was partly due to the militant mujahideens’ vision of being 
able to fight both of the superpowers, the United States and the USSR, after having waged 
the victorious jihad  supposedly causing the fall of the latter. (Roy 2004, 292–293) 
However,  the  other  part  has  to  do  with  the  fact  that  during  that  time,  the  Muslim  world  
faced more and more US military interventions, encouraging the late leader of the global 
jihadi movement al-Qaeda and an Afghan veteran mujahideen, Osama Bin Laden, to 
harshen his anti-US rhetoric after the 1990–1991 Gulf War. Roy argues, however, that the 
anti-Western ideas of the mujahideen did not only appear after the Gulf War, rather they 
were present already. They were not only fighting the Soviets with the Western help but 
instead they saw themselves as opposing both ends. (Roy 2004, 293) 
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On the contrary, professor of Middle Eastern Politics and International Relations at the 
London School of Economics, Fawaz A. Gerges, argues in his book The Rise and Fall of 
Al-Qaeda (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) that before, Bin Laden’s worldview 
was fixed on waging war against the Soviets, an “anti-Marxist crusade”, which was 
extensively supported by the United States. Then only the aftermath of the 1990–1991 Gulf 
War, the US military intervention and stationing of troops in Saudi-Arabia (which is the 
birthplace of Islam and home to Bin Laden), eventually changed his attitudes towards the 
United States completely. (Fawaz 2011, 48-49) Whichever the case, Bin Laden’s antipathy 
towards America started inevitably to flourish and influence other proponents of the jihadi 
cause worldwide.  
 
2.1.3 The culturalist approach 
Now if we were to pose the question whether or not Islam is compatible with the West, we 
would have to make some kind of presuppositions on these two elements – What is Islam? 
What do we mean by the West? And, most importantly, why do we raise this question? 
When considering these questions, it is crucial to understand that they rest heavily on the 
essential  worldview  separating  Islam  and  the  West  as  two  different  homogenous  and  
uniform entities – otherwise the whole issue of these two opposing ends would fall in its 
own paradox. (Roy, 2004) 
Roy calls  this  a  “mirror  construction”  between the  extension  of  US power  and  Islam (or  
better: the call for defence of an “imaginary ummah”). He claims that this mirroring 
position is explicitly expressed in Samuel Huntington’s ‘cliché of the decade: the clash of 
civilizations’.13 According to Roy, the problem with this concept is its culturalist approach, 
which regards Islam (and on the opposing side, the West) as being the issue per se. This is 
problematic because it reduces Islam into one discrete entity and “a coherent and closed set 
of beliefs, values and anthropological patterns embodied in a common society, history and 
territory, which allows us to use the term as an explanatory concept for almost everything 
                                               
13 See footnote on p.7, in Introduction. 
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involving Muslims”. This view is not just common among the ordinary citizens, but also 
academics, journalists, politicians and even some Muslims (be it conservative, moderate or 
fundamentalists) hold on to this argument. Hence, the culturalist approach seems to engage 
both the critics and the “defenders” of Islam. (Roy 2004, 9–10; 294) 
Roy emphasizes the distinction between Islam as a religion and the so-called “Muslim 
culture”. These terms tend to get increasingly mixed up in the contemporary discussions 
about  Islam,  when  the  explanations  for  the  problems  of  the  Muslim  world  are  only  
searched  within  the  religion  of  Islam.  This  has  to  do  with  similar  state  of  confusion  
between the terms religion and culture. Roy argues that this is evident for example in the 
constant mixing up of Muslims and Arabs, despite the fact that there are various religious 
identities in the Arab societies and the majority of world’s Muslims are not Arabs. 
Furthermore, nowadays even the term Muslim provokes political connotations, because it 
inevitably refers to “some sort of neo-ethnic group” opposing the West, rather than its 
religious aspects. (Roy 2004, 10–13; 332) Said highlights the fact that the concepts of the 
Orient or the West are both man-made and fictional categories produced to validate and 
recognize the other. These concepts are easily used in manipulating and producing fear, 
anger and arrogance. He argues that the focal point of all this manifests in “us” Westerners 
versus Islam and the Arabs. (Said 2011, 334) 
The debate on values as an explanatory argument when regarding the perceived opposition 
between Islam and the West is not eligible according to Roy or Said. They both emphasize 
the fact that there is no real universal consensus on the essence of the Western values, such 
as human rights, freedom of expression, democracy and the women’s rights. Instead, the 
issue is under constant debate between various communities within the Western society. 
Said points out that the US war in Iraq would never have occurred without the traditional 
orientalist point of view, without the strong opposition between us and them, without the 
idea that those nations are not like us and don’t respect our values. (Roy 2004, 14–15; Roy 
2007, viii; Said 2011, 335–337) 
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2.1.4 Contemporary comments 
Roy seeks to find several contemporary explanations for the perception of Islam serving as 
the  main  enemy and  threat  for  the  West.  First  of  all,  he  states  that  the  events  of  modern  
history have had their effect in influencing the mindset of many observers, mainly starting 
from the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, followed by the collapse of the USSR and the 
infamous attacks of 9/11 (Roy 2004, 16). Of course, after the publishing of Roy’s study in 
2004, history has witnessed several other incidents which can be seen as a continuum for 
the  building  up  of  this  phenomenon  of  opposition,  such  as  the  rise  of  the  al-Dawla  al-
Islamiyya  (better  known  as  ISIS,  ISIL,  IS,  Daesh)  and  the  consequences  it  has  had  –  or  
might have in future – to our societies.  
Second of all, Roy argues that almost all of the conflicts where Western interests are 
somehow involved (be it oil, “war on terrorism”, etc.) have to do with Muslim countries. 
Hence, to be exact, the main battlefields of the West continue to be located in Muslim 
majority countries. Thirdly, Islamic radical organizations have been the most active ones 
during the past two – or now already three – decades. (Roy 2004, 16; 332) 
As  the  fourth  remark  Roy  points  out  that  the  issue  of  Muslim  immigration  continues  to  
serve as an anthem of polarizing rhetoric. Since the immigration has been followed by the 
establishing of substantial Muslim communities in Western societies, especially in its 
arenas of social exclusion, it has intensified the perceived link between Islam and all 
immigration as such. At least in European societies, while in the US the situation can be 
perceived as somewhat different partly due to the fact that visible religiosity is a part of the 
public social and political life. (Roy 2004, 16–17; 332) 
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2.1.5 Western public discourse maintaining polarization 
Goerzig and Al-Hashimi (2015) argue that the Western public discourse is continuously 
producing a polarized discourse between the West and Islam. By keeping up this 
dichotomy the Western public discourse in itself can, in fact, be seen radical as well. Hence 
public discourse and the radicalization of Europe’s Muslims are both flourishing in a 
symbiotic way (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi 2015, 32). In their study, Goerzig and Al-Hashimi 
emphasize the consequences what this kind of divisive media attention might have for 
Europe’s social cohesion. At the same time drawing attention to the effects the polarized 
public discourse might have on the Muslim communities in Europe (Goerzig & Al-
Hashimi 2015, 32). 
The media discourse in several Western European countries presents a distinctively 
separate in-group and out-group. The in-group as being the private Muslim culture in 
family sphere, whereas the out-group as the Western culture which especially second and 
third generations of Muslims experience in school. These two groups are essential in 
framing the identity of Muslims in Europe. However, by drawing a clear line between 
these groups, the European discourse forces the individual to see these two as opposing 
groups and hence the “self-categorization as an European Muslim becomes impossible”. 
(Goerzig & Al-Hashimi 2015, 4) 
Goerzig and Al-Hashimi claim that the public discourse in Western Europe tends to group 
all  Muslims  under  one  Islamic  identity  and  thus  ignore  the  various  identities  a  Muslim  
might have, such as Sunni or Shiite. This picture of all Muslims as a homogenous entity 
created by the public discourse is presented as opposing the European Western culture 
hence denying the existence of European secular Muslims. According to Goerzig and Al-
Hashimi, Islam is depicted in the public discourse as being equivalent to religious 
extremism and yet if a Muslim would want to criticize this, it’s interpreted as terrorism 
sympathizing. They continue by stating that when the public discourse requires European 
Muslims to choose between identities, it is in fact at the same time destroying these 
identities and creating identity loss – hence advancing radicalization. (Goerzig & Al-
Hashimi 2015, 3–4; 20–21) 
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2.2 Islam in Finland 
When discussing Islam and Muslims in Finland, we are talking about the most studied 
immigrant religion and a historical minority engaging diverse ethnic and religiously 
heterogeneous groups. By 2011, there were roughly 60,000–65,000 Muslims residing in 
Finland. This number makes up merely above 1% of the country’s total population. The 
majority of Muslims in Finland are immigrants and about two thirds have a refugee 
background – the rest are their children, converts or they are part of the traditional Tatar 
community. Most of the Muslims living in Finland are Sunni, even though they represent 
various traditions and schools of thought. About 10–15% of Muslims are Shi’a. The 
number of Muslims is estimation due to the fact that all Muslims do not register officially 
in religious communities. Hence the statistics based on registrations are not completely 
reliable. (Martikainen 2013, 237; Martikainen 2008, 71–72; Muhammed 2011, 59–61) 
During the last three decades, Finland has witnessed an excess in the number of Muslims 
partly due to conversion, but mostly because of relatively high birth rate and immigration. 
The migration of Muslims to Finland is distinguishably related to asylum seeking and 
refugee conditions (Martikainen 2013; Muhammed 2011, 58). The first prominent Muslim 
settling in Finland was that of the Tatars in the late 19th century. Even if the Tatars today 
represent a minority among the Finnish Muslim communities, they can be seen as well 
integrated and established in the Finnish society (Leitzinger 1999, 25–55; Martikainen 
2008, 68). The biggest national and ethnic groups are the Somalis, Arabs from several 
countries, the Kurds, the Turks, the Bosniaks from the former Jugoslavia, and the Albans 
from Kosovo. (Martikainen 2013; Muhammed 2011, 58–65)  
It is hard to find relevant information about the religious identity, activities and tendencies 
of the Finnish Muslims. However, according to several European and Finnish studies, it 
can be estimated that even if a majority identify themselves as Muslims, only a minority is 
religiously active – with the exception of the celebration of religious holidays. The 
majority of Finnish Muslims live in the Helsinki metropolitan area and in some of the 
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biggest cities, such as Turku and Tampere. There are about 50 mosque associations in 
Finland, in addition to approximately 30 other Muslim associations focusing on e.g. youth 
or women. The most central representative community is the umbrella organization of 
Islamic Council of Finland (Suomen Islamilainen Neuvosto, SINE). All in all, the number 
of mosques in Finland is about 50, along with several prayer rooms scattered around the 
country. (Martikainen 2013, 239–240)  
According to the research done for this study, there are at least 36 different kind of Muslim 
associations (including mosques and other groups gathering for religious practicing) 
present at the Helsinki metropolitan area. Some of them are more active than others, but 
detailed information about all of their activities is almost impossible to find due to the fact 
that  some  of  them  do  not  openly  provide  any  contact  information.  If  the  contact  
information however is provided, it became obvious during this study that in most cases, it 
was not up-to-date. Nevertheless, the diversity of Muslim communities in the Helsinki 
metropolitan area is remarkable.  
 
2.3 The threat of Islamist terrorism in Europe 
Since 9/11 the fear of terrorism has increased and Muslims living in Western countries 
have been under the surveillance of the society. There has been an ongoing demand of 
Muslims to clearly and publicly indicate their side in the polarized debate. As stated by the 
former  US  President  George  W.  Bush:  “either  you  are  with  us,  or  you  are  with  the  
terrorists.”  In this black and white situation claiming for an either-or-answer, according to 
Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, there is little room left for those who would like to stay objective 
and neutral in their opinions. (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi 2015, 48) 
Without a doubt, behind some terrorist acts there are individuals, who want to identify 
themselves with Islam in one way or another; and who publicly announce the motivating 
factor for these incidents to be jihad, their religious duty. By giving these jihadists 
superfluous media visibility, the public discourse nowadays associates terrorism in Europe 
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automatically to breed from the Islamic faith (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi 2015, 48). However, 
according to the statistics provided by Europol, only two of the 152 terrorist acts 
performed in the EU in 2013 were mainly motivated by religion. Moreover, in 2011, there 
were  altogether  174  attacks  committed  in  EU,  and  yet  none  of  them  had  a  religious  
inspiration. (Europol, The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2014)  
Before the mid- 1990’s there were no incidents of Islamist terrorism in Europe, as 
previously the terrorism scene was dominated by national and separatist organizations 
(such as the ETA in Spain) or professional terrorists from radical left or Arab secular 
organizations. After 1995, however, things changed for Europe when the first terrorism 
incident inspired by a radical Islamist agenda took place in Paris. Since then, the terrorist 
attacks with an Islamic inspiration on European soil have included for instance the Lyon 
synagogue attack; the Madrid train bombings in 2004 followed by the London 
underground attack in 2005; several failed terrorist attack plans in Sweden, Scotland, 
England,  and  Germany;  and  the  attack  in  the  office  of  Charlie  Hebdo  in  Paris.  
Nevertheless, most of the terrorist attacks with an Islamist agenda are happening outside of 
Europe. (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi 2015, 48; 68) 
 
2.4 The evolution of violent extremism in the situation overviews of Finnish 
National Action Plan for Preventing Violent Extremism 
Some countries have decided to produce government policy reports focusing on the 
processes of radicalization and its  effects in the society (Ranstorp 2010, 3).  For example,  
the one made in Finland by the Finnish Ministry of Interior is called the “National Action 
Plan for Preventing Violent Extremism” (Kansallinen toimenpideohjelma väkivaltaisen 
ekstremismin ennaltaehkäisemiseksi), which was published in Helsinki on 2012.  
Since then, five situational overviews concerning violent extremism in Finland have been 
produced, the last one published in February 2015. When studying all five of these, there 
are several interesting points that stood out. Firstly, in the first situation overview 
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published in January 2013, none of the presented groups which might possibly radicalize 
into violent extremism14 were perceived as a threat to national security.15 However, when 
coming to the second situation overview published in August 2013, it is noteworthy that 
the Extreme left-wing and radical alternative movements had activated their functions due 
to the increase in the activities of the Right-wing extremists. This might indicate that 
extremist behavior usually motivates even more extremist behavior – and especially from 
the opposing side.  
At  this  point  however,  violent  Islamic  extremism was  not  seen  as  a  notable  threat  to  the  
national security, even though it was mentioned that some individuals had left the country 
as foreign fighters to Syria. Nonetheless, it was acknowledged that these individuals can 
cause problems to the society when returning to Finland from the conflict zone.16 
However, in the third situation overview from March 2014, it is stated that the perceived 
threat of violent Islamic extremism has grown stronger as well as viewing the returning 
foreign fighters as a potential threat to the national security.17  
In the fourth situation overview published in September 2014, it is stated that the number 
of new members within the extreme right-wing Finnish Resistance Movement (Suomen 
Vastarintaliike, SVL) has increased. At the same time, the international phenomenon of 
violent Islamic extremism is more and more familiar within the Finnish society and the 
growing tensions between the Shi’as and the Sunnis due to the conflict in Syria are seen as 
particularly troubling. In addition, it is mentioned that some potential lone actors have 
                                               
14 These groups are, as stated in the situation overview: Right-wing extremism, Extreme left-wing and radical 
alternative movements, Violent Islamic extremism and the lone actors. 
15 Väkivaltainen ekstremismi Suomessa - tilannekatsaus 1/2013, 
http://www.intermin.fi/download/43947_Vakivaltainen_ekstremismi_Suomessa_-_tilannekatsaus_1-
2013_FINAL.pdf?6feecd8c231ed288 (accessed Oct 25, 2015) 
16 Väkivaltainen ekstremismi Suomessa - tilannekatsaus 2/2013, 
http://www.intermin.fi/download/46677_Vakivaltainen_ekstremismi_Suomessa_-_tilannekatsaus_2-
2013_FINAL.pdf?57ccc38c231ed288 (accessed Oct 25, 2015) 
 
17 Väkivaltainen ekstremismi Suomessa - tilannekatsaus 1/2014, 
http://www.intermin.fi/download/52012_Tilannekatsaus_1-2014_FINAL.pdf?fb3c908c231ed288 (accessed 
Oct 25, 2015) 
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already been identified and the risks they might pose to the national security have been 
assessed.18  
The fifth situational overview from February 201519, states that violent extremist thinking 
is increasingly noticeable in the attitudes of the students of Finnish high schools and 
vocational  schools.  The  strongest  signs  of  violent  extremist  thinking  are  demonstrated  in  
anger and intolerance based on political or religious ideologies. Additionally, there have 
been some signs of the glorification of violence and attitudes causing fear. All in all, it 
seems that the threat of violent extremism in its various forms has increased during the past 
three years.  
 
3 RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1 Interviewing process and the method used 
The empirical part of this thesis is built on 6 semi-structured interviews, which were 
conducted in Helsinki and Espoo during March, April, May and August 2015. Three 
interviews were conducted in English and three in Finnish, following the interviewee’s 
own language of choice. They were conducted in various locations: in the mosque, in the 
work place of the respondent, in the library of University of Helsinki and in the lobby of 
Metropolia School of Applied Sciences. Despite the fact that I had scheduled around one 
hour for each interview, including the familiarizing moments in the beginning and 
                                               
18 Väkivaltainen ekstremismi Suomessa - tilannekatsaus 2/2014, 
http://www.intermin.fi/download/55540_Vakivaltainen_ekstremismi_Suomessa_-_tilannekatsaus_2-
2014_FINAL.pdf?b7cf668c231ed288 (accessed Oct 25, 2015) 
 
19 Väkivaltainen ekstremismi Suomessa – tilannekatsaus 1/2015, 
http://www.intermin.fi/download/58696_Vakivaltainen_ekstremismi_Suomessa_-_tilannekatsaus_1-
2015_FINAL.pdf?837f4a8c231ed288 (accessed Oct 25, 2015) 
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concluding discussions in the end, finally all of the interviews lasted between 1h 15 
minutes to 1h 45 minutes, depending on the schedule of the informant.  
The interviews were conducted using a semi-structured (thematic) method. In this method, 
the researcher seeks to understand the phenomenon by encouraging the respondent to 
discuss as much and as freely as possible on specifically designed themes. These themes 
are designed to capture the nature of the phenomenon, and to answer the research questions 
of the study in the best possible way, hence enhancing the understanding of the researcher. 
(Kananen 2014, 24) 
This method was chosen by the researcher, because when properly executed, it will 
provide much new information on a phenomenon, which still lacks other studies. 
Moreover, it can contribute in producing new ideas for further studies. With this method 
especially, the phenomenon itself and the factors affecting the phenomenon can best be 
described. In this specific case, a study on the phenomenon of radicalization within the 
Muslim communities in the Helsinki metropolitan area, providing viewpoints from the 
Muslim communities themselves, is a previously uncovered subject. This is why using a 
thematic method when conducting the interviews was the most reasonable choice. By 
using this method, it is possible to touch the explanations and motivating factors for this 
phenomenon. (Kananen 2014, 38) 
The interviews themselves were intense, versatile and rewarding. All of the interviewees 
found the matters discussed important and were eager to share their perceptions about 
them.  All  of  the  interviews  were  transcribed  immediately  after  they  were  done,  in  sum a  
total of 96 pages. This way they were still fresh in memory, and all perceptions of the 
interview situation could be gathered. At this point, several notes and mind maps on the 
subject were created. This assisted in the analysis process, and helped to reform the 
interview question list to better respond to the research questions.   
The  rest  of  the  research  process  consisted  of  revisiting  the  theoretical  framework  of  the  
study and of analysing the data in the light of the research questions. This was done in 
order to access the data in a way which provides insights that are not as such articulated in 
the interviews. More details of the whole analysis process are offered in the analysis 
chapter. 
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3.2 Notes on the interviewees  
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, finding interviewees willing to participate in this 
study ended up being a time-consuming process. Most of the enquiries never received a 
reply, and many potential candidates choose not to take part in a research revolving around 
radicalization. After a few months of persistent and systematic attempts to acquire 
interviewees, finally a total of 6 people were willing to participate in this study. Ultimately 
the data collection of this research was rescued by a snowball effect, implying the process 
of acquiring possible interviewee contacts through the networks of the previous 
interviewee. If the purpose of this study would have been to conduct a quantitative study, 
or a survey, it would have been necessary to keep searching for more interviewees. 
However, in this case, since I am conducting a qualitative research, the number of the 
respondents is not the most crucial part for the success of the study. (e.g. Eskola & 
Suoranta 1998) 
Initially, I was hoping to acquire more interviews, but within the timeframe scheduled for a 
Master’s thesis, it was unfortunately impossible to continue the search. Moreover, the 
difficulties in finding interviewees for a Master’s thesis research on radicalization raise a 
question of how this reflects the sensitive nature of the phenomenon and the current 
polarized situation of the Finnish society. This nature of the phenomenon poses some 
challenges for the study, and acts as a clear justification for certain anonymity of the 
interviewees. In order to protect the interviewees’ privacy, all private data identifying them 
is excluded, so that all information which could be recognizable for others is left out. For 
the  sake  of  the  real-life-feeling  of  this  study,  all  names  were  changed  into  pseudonyms,  
instead of merely numbering the participants. (Eskola & Suoranta 1998; Hirsjärvi & 
Hurme 2008) 
The imams were chosen as informants for this study for two reasons. First of all, they are 
generally in an influential position within their religious communities and thus they usually 
possess a large amount of valuable information concerning the concerns and activities of 
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the members of their community. Second of all, religious leaders are often approached by 
their members with every-day issues and especially members with migrant background 
might turn to seek support due to the low threshold compared to distant governmental 
officials. This makes imams interesting informants, because they have information about 
the whole community. Similar conditions apply for the representatives of Muslim 
organizations. They were contacted specifically due to their position in their surrounding 
Muslim community and networks. This is why they are able to reach their message to 
several members of their communities, and to recognize and evaluate the feelings and 
attitudes within their communities. Hence by conducting the research interviews with these 
respondents in question, it was possible to gain information about the overall viewpoints 
and atmosphere within the communities they represent. (Eskola & Suoranta 1998, 18; IOM 
2011) 
The group of informants gathered ended up being a heterogenic crowd, representing 
various ethnic backgrounds, different age groups and different approaches to the issue at 
stake: 
? 5 of the informants are male and 1 is female 
? 4  of the informants are imams and 2 are representatives of Muslim organizations 
? 5 of the informants are born-Muslims and one had converted several years ago to 
Islam  
? They are all aged between 29 and 56 
? 5 of the informants are adherents of Sunni Islam, and one is a Shi’a 
? They all live and work in the Helsinki metropolitan area  
? In this study, the respondents are referred to by using these pseudonyms, 
respectively: Kareem, Ali, Amina, Abdullah, Ahmad and Caleb  
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3.3 Ethical questions concerning the interviews 
It is necessary to reflect upon various ethical questions before conducting any interviews or 
even designing the interview questions and themes. According to Kvale and Brinkmann 
(2009, 68), there are four fields in traditionally ethical guidelines, which need to be 
considered when doing an interview study. These are as follows: 
? informed consent 
? confidentiality 
? consequences 
? role of the researcher 
 
When planning the interviews, all these areas were placed under close inspection by going 
through the extensive list of questions provided by Kvale and Brinkmann (2009, 68–69). 
These questions assisted in forming an image of the ethical protocol, which needs to be 
revisited throughout the whole research process. It supported also in starting the interview 
process and in preparing for instance the actual consent form presented to the interviewee 
candidates at the time of research invitation.  
 
3.3.1 Consequences 
Before entering the interview stage of this research, it was essential to carefully consider 
what kind of beneficial consequences could this study have and hence, is it really 
worthwhile. As the driving ambition behind this research project is to offer new knowledge 
about a specific angle of the radicalization phenomenon, and hopefully contribute in 
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improving the circumstances of the research participants, the usefulness of this study is 
justified. (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009, 68) 
According to the research results of this study, the research participants all experienced the 
situation of the Muslim communities in Finland as currently being difficult to some extent 
and for different reasons. This study will hopefully contribute in improving the situation by 
providing first of all, a platform for the thoughts and insights of the interviewees, and 
secondly, some suggestions for lessons-learned and developing of best practices, as well as 
ideas for further research. (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009, 68) 
The possible negative consequences of this study were considered not only for the 
participating subjects but also for the groups they represent. As the main objective of this 
study is to provide new information and hopefully improve the current situation, the goal 
to minimize all the risk of harm to the participants served as a guideline throughout the 
research. Since the hypothetical harm would mainly be involved with the exposing of the 
participants identities, anonymity is a priority in this study. (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009, 73–
74) 
 
3.3.2 Informed consent 
In the process of planning the research interviews, I designed an informed consent (see 
Appendix) for the purpose of this study with the help of Kvale & Brinkmann (2009, 70–
72).The purpose of this consent form is to provide the possible interviewee candidates all 
the relevant information, which they need in order to be able to make the decision of 
whether they want to participate or not. This informed consent was attached to the ’call for 
research participants’ and sent via e-mail to all the participant candidates of this study. In 
addition, it was printed and handed out to all of the research participants in the beginning 
of every interview. All of the interviewees read it through and signed an informed consent 
form, in which they agreed to the terms and conditions of this research.  
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3.3.3 Confidentiality 
In this study, the confidentiality of the interview subjects has been carefully considered. 
This means that all the private data, or any other kind of data, which could potentially be 
recognizable to others, has not been disclosed. The confidentiality of the participants is 
important due to the notably sensitive nature of the research topic. The participants were 
informed on confidentiality issues in the written informed consent and before every 
interview. (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009, 72–73) 
How to then ensure these matters of confidentiality in practice? In this research, this is first 
of all a matter of anonymity. All interviewees were guaranteed that their names or any 
other identifying elements would not be visible in the published research, due to the 
sensitivity of the subject. This is why eventually I decided to change the names into 
pseudonyms. That way the humanity of the interviewees could be preserved at the same 
time protecting their real identities. In addition, in order to fully secure the anonymity of 
the study participants, their exact age, hometown or other identifying information is not 
provided. (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009, 72–73) 
Any access to the interviews besides that of the researcher is denied, in order to ensure the 
confidentiality of the participants. This was arranged by destroying all the interview data, 
both the recordings and the transcriptions, after the analysis phase of the study. (Kvale & 
Brinkmann 2009, 71–73) 
 
3.3.4 The role of the researcher 
When conducting interviews as the primary data of the research, the researcher’s role will 
always affect the study somehow. This is due to the high subjectivity that is present when 
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doing interviews; the researcher her- or himself is, in fact, the main instrument for 
obtaining knowledge. As the whole study is designed by the researcher, as well as the 
execution of the project, it is inevitable that the role of the researcher is omnipresent in the 
study. (Eskola & Suoranta 1998; Kvale & Brinkmann 2009, 74–75) 
In  this  study,  the  role  of  the  researcher  was  reflected  upon in  many ways.  Firstly,  it  was  
reflected upon whether the fact that the researcher does not belong to the same religious in-
group as the participants might affect the study? This could, however, act as both positive 
and negative matter, depending on the participant’s point of view. In this study, 
considering the sensitivity of the research topic, would the participants have felt more at 
ease  talking  to  another  Muslim?  Or  on  the  contrary,  was  it  an  advantage  that  the  
interviewer was not a Muslim, and only present as part of the academia?  
In the course of the interview process, I was not directly confronted by these questions – 
apart from occasional enquiries about my personal religious views. However, as 
accentuated by René Gothóni (1997; 2000), when conducting fieldwork among religious 
communities in order to gain information of the religiosity and experiences of people, a 
certain amount of compassionate communication is needed. This requires from the 
researcher genuine competence in interchanging the elements of involvement and 
detachment towards the researched topic, for the sake of relevant academic perspective.  
This kind of compassionate competence in conducting research interviews is similarly 
emphasized by a Theologian specialized on pastoral counselling, Irja Kilpeläinen (1973). 
She accentuates the importance of active listening, in which the listener is completely 
present  and  shows  natural  and  real  interest  on  the  research  respondent.  This  kind  of  
emphatic  way to  conduct  interviews  focuses  on  creating  an  atmosphere  of  reliability  and  
respect into the interview situation. Therefore, the question of whether or not the research 
process is somehow effected by the fact that the researcher herself does not belong to the 
same religious in-group as the study respondents, is not completely applicable in this 
study. Under these circumstances, more emphasis has been placed on the self-positioning 
and reflection of the researcher. 
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4 ANALYSING THE DATA 
4.1 The qualitative analysis in this study 
I am employing a qualitative research method in this thesis and thus the aim is not to focus 
in the number of interviewees, or the quantity of the data, but rather on the quality. This 
study is not seeking to generalize the findings or to find a causal determination, because it 
would hardly serve the study purpose which is rather to gain a deeper understanding of this 
context-specific phenomenon. The goal is in giving a description of the phenomenon and 
finally be able to interpret it in the context of Islam. This description is not presumed to 
represent universal regularities, but rather the interest lies in the local, context specific, 
explanation of the phenomenon. (Alasuutari 2011, 38–39, 55; Eskola & Suoranta 1998, 18; 
Kananen 2014, 18; Kiviniemi 2001, 68) 
The  aim  of  qualitative  research  is  to  work  with  one  unit  of  observation  as  much  as  
possible. Hence each case will be comprehensively dealt with in depth making the need for 
generalizations irrelevant, as all findings will in the end only be accurate with the case in 
question. Qualitative research encourages the researcher to go to the actual field of the 
phenomenon to interview and observe. The aim is to get a direct contact with the research 
subject, the interviewee, and find out how they see and experience the real world. The 
study should be made in its own context. (Kananen 2014, 19; Kiviniemi 2001, 68) 
In this study, the analysis has been a long process shadowing all of its parts and elements, 
following all the steps that I have taken throughout this research. In fact, as stated by 
Eskola and Suoranta in their guide book for qualitative research (1998, 249–251), it is 
important for the researcher to understand the subjectivity of all studies – including the one 
in process. All steps and decisions along the way of the study have somehow been based 
on the researcher’s own expectations and perspectives. This makes the researcher him- or 
herself as the key instrument of data collecting and analysis, with the aim of filtering the 
real world as actual research findings. (Eskola & Suoranta 1998, 21; Flick 2002, 276; 
Kananen 2014, 19; Kiviniemi 2001, 68–69, 72).  
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The analysis aims to follow the instructions provided by Kvale and Brinkmann in their 
book about qualitative research interviewing (2009, 192–193). One of their arguments is 
that interviews should not be examined as only pure transcripts; rather they should be 
understood as living conversations. Furthermore, the interview statements are created as a 
cooperative process including both the interviewer and the respondent, who acts as a co-
author. Hence, the point is to open up the meaning of the respondents’ arguments and 
figure out a way to continue the dialogue with the co-authored transcription. The original 
story told by the respondent needs to be respected, but also reconstructed into another 
story, which is meaningful to this study.   
 
4.2 The analysis process 
The interviews are analysed with an inductive reasoning method, starting within the data 
itself. Instead of searching some variables which have been determined already before 
starting the analysis, I am trying to find the themes appearing as most significant for 
interpreting the phenomenon. The main focus is placed on the examination of the interview 
corpus, rather than seeking to test a specific theory within this contextual framework. This 
kind of analysis is especially useful when basic knowledge of a phenomenon is needed 
from a previously unstudied perspective – such as in this case, the radicalization 
phenomenon within the Muslim communities in the Helsinki metropolitan area. (Eskola & 
Suoranta 1998, 19; Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2008; Kiviniemi 2001, 68–69, 72) 
After having conducted the interviews and read through several times the transcribed data 
corpus, I started to carefully examine it in the light of the research questions. This is when 
I soon realized that there were some recurring themes emerging from the discussions 
spontaneously from the initiative of the respondents themselves. In addition, the key 
discussion themes which were designed beforehand to guide the interviews, provoked 
often as much thoughts and proved to be helpful in structuring the whole interview data 
corpus. (Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2008) 
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Consequently, the key categories for this analysis are both those which were initially 
designed by the researcher (four main categories), and those which appeared deliberately 
by  the  respondents  themselves  (two  subcategories).  Thus,  the  main  categories  are  as  
follows: Radicalization – general level and in the context of Islam; Radicalization, society 
and community level; Radicalization and media; and the future of the phenomenon. And 
the subcategories are: Injustice suffered by the Muslims; and the Underlying reasons for 
radicalization. 
 
 
4.3 Reporting the findings of the analysis: The main categories 
4.3.1 Radicalization – general level and in the context of Islam 
 
I have a feeling, that we still didn’t realize how serious the case is. 
Kareem 
 
This first category is dedicated to introducing the findings of the discussions on 
radicalization in general terms and in the context of Islam. It starts with a quote from 
Kareem, who insisted several times that the radicalization problem is a very serious one. 
Almost all of the others agreed with him except for Caleb, who felt that the whole issue is 
somewhat exaggerated: 
This whole question about radicalization is very frustrating. In my opinion, it has 
been put in a scale which it does not deserve in the Finnish context. The resources 
and man-hours that are put in this problem are not in any way correlating with the 
scale of this problem. I feel that this problem is much smaller than the resources it 
has got.  
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Caleb 
 
When talking about radicalization on a general level, Kareem wants to accentuate that it 
can be found in all parts of life, the element of radicalism can be traced in everything you 
do because it can be looked through various perspectives – in the thinking, in the approach 
and finally, in the actions.  
However, in terms of Islam, Kareem emphasizes that Islam does not encourage people to 
radicalize. Nevertheless, he highlights the fact that the harmony of Islam comprises 
everything; Islam embraces all parts of life. Thus, if a person claims that he has the right to 
dictate on them, according to Kareem, then this person might be seen as becoming radical 
in his approach. Kareem accentuates that all Muslims should behave according to the limit 
set of Islam. If then a person exceeds the limits of that area, according to Kareem, then he 
can be seen in the realm of radicalism.  
Abdullah, on the other hand, emphasizes that the understanding of the phenomenon is 
different  for  a  non-Muslim  and  a  Muslim.  In  his  opinion,  a  Muslim  finds  it  hard  to  
understand what non-Muslims mean by radicalization: 
Is it a Muslim who is too connected to his religion and practices the religion a 
way a Muslim is supposed to live his religion? 
Abdullah 
 
On the other hand, he states that he can understand the Western point of view, which in his 
words means by radicalization a situation when people result in leaving for conflict zone to 
fight. He wants to emphasize, however, that this confuses Muslims, because you cannot 
generalize all Muslims to have this ideology: 
Not every Muslim accepts this ideology; it doesn’t mean that it is what Islam is 
doing today. 
Abdullah 
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When discussing radicalization Amina wants to point out that it used to be a positive 
matter, but lately it has been perceived as negative: 
So it has maybe in a way changed company. It used to be sometimes positive to 
be radical in some things because then you usually take many things very 
seriously. But now it has been connected mainly to Islam, even though this 
diverse radicalism can for sure be found in all religions and all groups of people. 
Amina 
 
Amina states that the term radicalization is now only linked to Islamic religion: 
Even if they would not say it out loud, when hearing the word ‘radical’, they will 
link it to Islam and Muslims. Like nothing else or no one else could be radical. 
Radical as a word and as a term are taken as prisoners, and then said that this is 
now a bad thing, and now you are all radical! 
Amina 
 
She continues by stating that things are not being put in their right context, but rather what 
is only being discussed is the radicalization of Muslims: 
It’s very interesting that all Muslims are assumed to be oriented towards 
radicalism from birth. Like the surrounding circumstances would not affect us in 
any way? 
Amina 
 
Caleb points out similarly that it is problematic and frustrating that term is often 
immediately linked with religion and ideology, when they are never the sole reasons for 
radicalization. He draws an example of the Internet and states that if you google the term 
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radicalization you will directly be suggested links to the radicalization within Muslim 
communities. 
Abdullah emphasizes that those who have left are only a group of people, and what they 
are fighting for might not have anything to do with Islam. He explains that once they get 
there, they don’t see real Islam in people: 
It is only about people who are fighting for their own interests – – And they need 
interests to get me fight for you. So they use Islam to get Muslims to fight. And 
that’s all. 
Abdullah 
 
Kareem concludes that radicalization may not only lie in Muslims, but still Muslims are 
called to defend themselves for radicalization because of the fact that some Muslim youth 
have left to conflict zones. However, he admits that some of the Muslim youth have been 
seen participating in conflict and being willing to kill themselves. Kareem argues that this 
raises a lot of questions not only to Muslims, but to the whole society – “what is 
happening?” 
 
 
The terminology and outlook of radicalization  
When discussing the terminology of radicalization, Caleb emphasizes that even if there are 
groups and religious authorities who want to justify certain acts by using religious 
terminology, the term radical Islam still stigmatizes Islam in a certain way. He points out 
also that he is not sure whether this can at all be seen as part of this religious tradition. In 
fact, he wants to accentuate that by naming something radical Islam, we are at the same 
time increasing  the  legitimacy of  these  groups.  In  that  sense,  the  term might  also  have  a  
“backfire” -effect and that’s why it’s not useful.  
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When starting to find definitions for the term, Ali points out that it is, in fact, an amoeba 
term – meaning that it means whatever you want it to mean. There is always an agenda 
behind its use, and it is being used to label people as being radical. He compares it with the 
use of the term terrorism, and in his opinion both definitions depend much on who is using 
the term and what they want to mean by it. In his opinion, it is all about creating a certain 
image.  
Caleb claims that this term is used inaccurately as a synonym for extremism and violent 
extremism. He sees the term as problematic, because it has not been defined well, 
especially not in the media. He argues that the definitions are lacking mainly because when 
we start to talk about the nuances of the term it stops to interest the public. Caleb states that 
people rely on simple arguments and categories, because it is then easy for them to label 
issues which they do not understand. 
These points of view are partly echoed by Ahmad, who has the most critical approach 
towards the phenomenon of radicalization from all of the respondents. He claims that even 
the term ‘radical’ is just “junk created by the media”. He explains his resentment towards 
this issue by stating that he finds it unacceptable that ordinary practicing Muslims are 
called radical because of their clothing and outlook. However, he states that of course there 
are bad Muslims, who misinterpret the concept of the Koran – just like there are bad 
Christians. But the outlook of a practicing Muslim should never be the defining character 
of radicalism.  
This notion of the outlook defining the person’s state of radicalization was also criticized 
by Kareem, who points out that it is not visible on the features – you cannot see extremism 
or radicalism from a person’s outlook. He argues that radicalism is only visible in the 
actions,  and  the  hidden;  in  the  mind  of  a  person.  He  continues  to  state  that  this  is  not  a  
method the radicals will use. They will not approach those who are strong in their belief, 
and this is why they usually don’t go to mosques but rather to for example night clubs.  
The radicals don’t go near those who are strong in their belief. They usually don’t 
go to mosques, because the argument of Islam will question them. We can use the 
same text to proof that what they are claiming and doing is wrong. 
Kareem 
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4.3.2 Radicalization, society and community level 
The societal dimension of the radicalization phenomenon proved to be one of the key 
notions in understanding the essence of the phenomenon. The respondents all spent much 
time in elevating this issue from different perspectives in their statements. Most of them 
saw it as a problem facing the whole society, as a societal phenomenon.  
 
The role of the religious leaders and key influencers  
 
We should touch the issue from the grassroots-level. 
Kareem 
 
Most of the respondents emphasize the importance of religious leaders in dealing with this 
issue. Kareem, for example, states that they have the ability of smelling or tracing the 
element of radicalism within their own communities. They can sense the issue religiously 
and socially, or by looking at the atmosphere and the neglect the youth feel. 
In  our  role  as  imams,  preachers,  individuals,  we  have  the  ability  to  sense  
something. To smell something. Notice something. Even though it might be 
difficult for us to talk, but we have the ability to sense that something is wrong. 
Kareem 
 
When describing other methods the imams can use in tracing the radical element, Kareem 
accentuates that it is important to go to the source of things and try to verify the 
38 
 
 
 
truthfulness of these radicalization accusations. He continues to state that many times the 
imams,  they  don’t  find  it.  Hence  they  find  themselves  in  a  position,  where  they  need  to  
defend themselves for something that they are not part of.  
Kareem argues that it’s not only about what the imams can do, instead there are also 
influential people within the Muslim communities, whose impact can make changes 
happen. So, in his opinion, imams and those alike have the potential of making things 
different.  
In mosque, we have the tact to understand that this family, community or group of 
people have a problem. 
Kareem 
 
According to Abdullah, what the religious leaders can do about the situation is that they 
can try to discourage people from going to the conflict zones in their Friday sermon. He 
continues that it is not self-evident that the people will agree with you, because every 
Muslim has his own understanding of Islam. And if they have a different opinion, they 
usually will not contact you. But he states that enlightening Muslims is still important. 
Because it doesn’t look Islamic at all – – People go to fight jihad out of ignorance. 
If they would understand the true Islam, they would realize that it is wrong for 
them to make that decision. 
Abdullah 
 
Abdullah points out that after cooperative meetings with the authorities, he gives this news 
to the congregation in the Friday sermon and everyone wants to listen. Then they will 
discuss it with other Muslims in their networks and in that way, the message can reach a lot 
of people through the Friday sermon. That’s why, in Abdullah’s opinion, the cooperation 
between the religious leaders and the authorities could mean a success for the whole.  
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Ahmad states that the way religious leaders can act in this issue is to give speeches at the 
mosque. He adds that the imams don’t encourage or invite to these kinds of actions, rather 
their focus is in teaching the Muslims how to be a good Muslim. 
He gives an example of the sermon he gave right after the Charlie Hebdo attack: 
They have insulted our messenger. They make pictures of our messenger. Like he 
is  a  terrorist,  they call  him names.  And then they say that  this  is  the freedom of  
speech. After this incident, I gave a speech in the mosque and spoke about the 
virtues of our messenger – – So then I said to the people after I had shown the 
virtues of the messenger: “What the West they want from us? They want us that 
we revolt. That we become angry. That we go and demonstrate, and break and 
kill. No no! It wont’t work. Because we know who supports us is God. Who 
support our Prophet Muhammad is God!” 
Ahmad 
 
 
The role of the Muslim communities, families and youth organizations  
According  to  Ali,  the  Muslim  community  could  take  a  clearer  stand  on  this  issue  of  
radicalization and think carefully what kind of rhetoric is being used and what kind of 
consequences this might have. He feels that the community should give more support to 
the youth. They should work on the youth activities and organize religious teaching for the 
youth, by doing that the youth could get meaningful things to do and socialize with other 
Muslim youth, get new friends and boost their confidence and sense of being accepted as 
they are. The Muslim communities should assist the youth especially in developing a 
strong and clear Muslim identity. At the moment, the communities have not succeeded in 
providing a strong enough Islamic identity for the youth or tools for self-confidence.  
Ali continues to state that this is important because a weak Muslim identity can lead into a 
crisis  situation,  which  might  escalate  to  an  extreme point.  At  this  point,  the  youth  might  
want to make a complete separation from the so-called Western way of living, because it is 
seen as something entirely unmatchable with the Islamic way of living. At this point, the 
only path to mend one’s ways seems to be found in the extreme rhetoric.   
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Amina argues that the Muslim communities should themselves be more active in dealing 
with this issue. In her opinion, one of the most important factors is that the Muslims feel as 
a part of this society, and that’s why Muslims should start more projects where they can 
give other Muslims a chance to be part of this society. She feels that this is a key issue in 
preventing radicalization, because alienated and segregated Muslims are more prone to 
turn to radical groups. 
Amina gives an example that there could be a service provided for new immigrants, 
refugees and asylum seekers where they could get help and services from other Muslims. 
This way they would feel that they are in a safe environment. She feels that now we are in 
a situation where the society is pushing Muslims further away from itself. Amina points 
out that more projects engaging Muslims are needed and that it might be the only way to 
get people to accept the Muslims as a part of this society.  
Now I feel that we have been outsourced as the foreign creatures, the whole Islam 
and Muslims. People are always discussing Muslims together with immigrants, as 
if  it  was  a  synonym.  And  that  way  we  have  also  outsourced  what  it  causes  in  
people’s minds, like “they are not from here; they are not part of us”. I think 
about this quite a lot, because as a Finnish Muslim, I know the Finnish ways and 
the Finnish habits and I can make conversations with Finnish people. But still, I 
sometimes get the feeling that this is not my country anymore, or I feel that I am 
anyway not accepted just the way I am. Then what about an immigrant, who 
might not even know the language? 
Amina 
 
Amina points out that the greatest problem in the Muslim communities facing this problem 
is  the  lack  of  resources,  as  all  positions  (even  most  of  the  imams)  are  volunteers  –  and  
volunteers are not motivated in volunteering forever. This is something Muslims 
contemplate in their communities, and as long as they won’t receive any funding, the 
situation will never change.  
You cannot do things when you would like to, rather you have to serve in your 
position all the time, you have no choice. It’s like obligatory volunteering. And 
this will drive the situation towards not succeeding in doing anything. 
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Amina 
 
Caleb agrees with the other respondents emphasizing the role of Muslim communities in 
dealing with this issue. He wants to see open discussions about these matters. Now he has 
seen only religious leaders and Islamic community leaders talking about these violent 
organizations and why their actions are far from being Islamic. However, Caleb continues 
that because this is a matter of individual cases and not of a community-level-problem as 
such, it deserves a different kind of approach.  
If it was about the community having a problem – – that a significant part of the 
community feels that this is a problem or that verifiably a significant part of the 
community  has  this  problem.  Then  we  should  start  to  think  about  what  is  the  
community’s solution for this problem. 
Caleb 
 
Caleb  points  out  that  it  is  difficult  to  know  what  one  or  two  people  are  thinking  or  
planning. Instead, he accentuates the importance of tight family relations. He feels that in 
dealing with this problem it is important that the parents know what their children are 
doing and support them. In a tight family unit, it might be possible to identify these kinds 
of anxieties.  
Kareem, however, argues that the families are usually helpless when their children leave to 
conflict zones. He states that it seems that they don’t know their children. They think that 
their children are good Muslims, but they are ignorant of what is happening outside. 
According to Kareem, the Muslim families could have a lot of power in dealing with 
radicalization. He states that they should be taken in to the cooperative action between the 
authorities,  the  society  and  the  school.  Kareem  states  that  if  the  school  organizes  
something, the Muslim families might come or not – but if the school would organize 
something involving their religion, the family feels that it touches them and that they have 
to react. In this sense, the power of religion is significant. 
42 
 
 
 
Families, schools, youth – they all live in different worlds. Can we combine these 
three elements together? 
Kareem 
 
When discussing the role of the youth organizations in the radicalization phenomenon and 
its prevention, Caleb mentions that there are many things they can do. First, one of the key 
issues is to tackle social alienation. This can be done by spending time with the youth and 
organizing meaningful activities for them.  
Second matter is that it is important to promote discussions on the feelings of injustice and 
other matters which interest the youth. If they are concerned about some population’s 
distress in particular, it must be discussed and considered whether something could be 
done to improve their situation, for instance, to collect charity, or so on. Caleb argues that 
this has an empowering effect which can prevent the feeling of powerlessness caused by 
the injustice. Thirdly, it is important to work with the authorities, in order to give a 
common content and perspective on matters, so that the excess of the actions which might 
worsen the situation can be prevented.  
There is still that danger that the communities feel that these actions are directed 
only on our community. This gives a wrong signal to the Muslim youth, who 
might feel that these actions need to be targeted at you specifically, because 
otherwise there is the danger that you will radicalize or join these kind of 
organizations (such as  ISIS).  I  feel  that  this  is  alarming and it  needs to be taken 
into consideration. 
Caleb 
 
All in all, Caleb emphasizes that it is important also within the youth organizations to give 
this matter those resources that it actually requires, and not more. Because at least in the 
organization he represents the issue of radicalization has not been brought up much. He 
reminds that the youth usually deal with problems which have nothing to do with 
radicalization.  
43 
 
 
 
 
 
The importance of cooperation  
Abdullah underlines the importance of the cooperation between the authorities and the 
religious communities – including the youth. He points out that so far, the youth have not 
been present in the meetings.  
Religious leaders can make a change – if they are able to make youth part of 
them. It’s not easy. 
Abdullah 
 
Kareem agrees and argues that the best solution can only be acquired through cooperation 
between the authorities, the government, the schools, the specialists, the society, the 
Muslim communities, the families and the imams – or those, who are active in the society 
and who feel ready to work with the authorities. All of these key players need to feel that 
they are truly part of the cooperation process. Kareem points out that nothing will happen 
from the side of the religious leaders, before the trust is earned.  
Until the imams feel that they can work with the authorities. Because you can 
make  calls,  but  none  of  them will  feel  that  I  can  trust  this:  ‘how can  I  trust  the  
authorities? How can I trust the society?’ Until they feel that they are part of this 
society – believe me, changes can happen. Until they are able to see that now 
something serious is coming from the society – believe me, they can do a lot. 
Kareem 
 
Kareem criticizes the way the cooperation meetings are executed. He feels that the issue 
has not been touched as it is, from the grassroots level. 
Now we only call a meeting and make a decision. This is your decision. It doesn’t 
have an effect on anybody. 
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Kareem 
 
According to Kareem, the cooperation is needed, because in a society like the one we are 
living in, it is not helpful to stay one-sided. He feels that Muslims have a lot to give. 
Kareem points out that the specialists’ point of view is important, and he respects their 
approach. However, he feels that their approach should be channeled through other non-
methodological and non-specialist area, where these two could cooperate and develop 
something new altogether. 
How can we do anything if the whole society is looking at Muslims and pointing 
a finger at us: “You are the problem! Handle it!” I think we need to be heard, 
when we suggest something. And not depend so much only on specialists. 
Kareem 
 
 
The role of the society and authorities  
When discussing the role of society in dealing with this issue, Ali feels that there is no one 
solution for this phenomenon; rather it should be approached from many different angles 
and viewpoints, by different organizations. Emphasis needs to be placed on the preventive 
matters.  However,  he  feels  that  there  is  much  the  society  could  do.  First  of  all,  he  
emphasizes the fact that this issue should be dealt already at the grassroots level, it should 
be for instance discussed in schools, where they should work for creating an open and 
trustworthy atmosphere.  
He continues to emphasize the responsibility of the media, and that the politicians should 
take this polarization of the society seriously. More funding should be granted for the 
preventing matters of the police and more emphasis should be given to the preventing 
matters. He argues that we need to be ready to accept everyone as a part of this society.  
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Caleb, on the other hand, mentions that it would be important to try to affect the Western 
foreign politics which is oppressing the Muslims. However, he understands that even if this 
matter is highly important in the whole issue of radicalization, there is little a small country 
like Finland can do about it.   
Kareem accentuates that approaching the issues of extremism and radicalism should be a 
long  process.  It  cannot  be  solved  with  one  meeting  in  a  one  month  process  immediately  
after the incident. Instead, he suggests that well-planned actions need to be taken on the 
educational side, on organizational level, such as the mosque or the civil society. 
He gives an example of the possibilities of a group of organizations and individuals who 
could study the matter with concrete analysis from the initiative of for example Vantaa or 
Helsinki. These studies should not be academic, but instead they should involve people 
from various backgrounds talking from their heart. They could give the authorities and 
police information on what they practically see. Kareem argues that with this kind of 
cooperation with the society, communities and authorities, many things can happen. And 
even if something small could be done, it could be considered as a starting point. 
Furthermore, Abdullah emphasizes that the authorities should focus on preventing 
measures by trying to work with those who are not gone. He argues that this can only be 
done by contacting the Muslims or the imams to use the pulpit as a means of sending 
information.  According  to  Abdullah,  the  authorities  can  do  nothing  alone  –  they  can  
achieve things only with religious leaders.  
If  we want  to  succeed in this  country,  we need to work with the authorities  and 
they need to assist us. 
Abdullah 
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4.3.3 Radicalization and media 
All of the interviewees emphasized the role of the media in this issue. Caleb argues that the 
media has given the phenomenon of radicalization a much larger role than it deserves. In 
his opinion, the style in which it has been reported in the media is problematic, and that the 
terminology, such as the foreign fighters has not been properly defined. According to 
Caleb, all who have left to the conflict zones have been demonized. He argues that this is 
not done all out explicitly, but the way in which it is reported is problematic.  
For example, that “number game” stating how many people have left (to fight at 
conflict zones) when we don’t know what they are doing there. If I put myself in 
the position of a regular Finnish person, I might think that all 60 have left to fight 
and kill innocent civilians. One can easily take this as truth by only reading the 
news. It is at the least poorly articulated if not just badly reported, when you don’t 
bring up the nuances of the situation. 
Caleb 
 
Caleb emphasizes that even if in the media it has been reported that there has been 
systematic recruiting (for ISIS e.g.) in Finnish Muslim communities, he still has not seen 
any  signs  of  this.  He  states  that  he  has  never  met  anyone  who wants  to  leave  to  conflict  
zone in the mosque. He worries about the image this kind of reporting might give to the 
Finnish audience.  
What this causes for the reader is that they might start to think that “okay now in 
the mosques they do nothing else but recruit people for these (terrorist) 
organizations”. And this has a polarizing effect for the Finnish society. Especially 
among those kind of people who have never even been in contact with a Muslim. 
This is very unfortunate. 
Caleb 
 
Amina feels that the attitudes towards Islam have lately changed into more hostile. She 
feels that this is partly to blame on media, because it never gives news about positive 
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things. Amina points out that the responsibility of the media in how they create an image 
of this phenomenon is tremendous. She emphasizes that everything the journalists write 
and say will affect the future, and it’s their responsibility to think closely what kind of 
image they create for people in mixing things and terminology. Their responsibility in her 
opinion is also to bring up different sides of the story. She states that this is especially 
important because people don’t have the time to think what actually is behind the issues, 
and what causes them.     
According to Amina, one of the problematic issues created by the media is the public 
commenting written at the bottom of every news article in the Internet media. She states 
that these comments can get nasty and outrageous and then many who read them might 
think that this is actually the general opinion of Finnish people. Caleb, on the other hand, 
argues that it is visible in the Internet discussions that the attitudes towards Islam and 
Muslims have hardened. He states that the rhetoric and style of commenting under news 
headlines is grim to read. 
In my opinion, these extremists who write their hate comments in the news have 
in a way taken over Finnishness, the same way as ISIS has abducted Islam. 
Amina 
 
Kareem argues that in Finland, when media talks about Islam it has a certain agenda, 
because the media works for money and thus is never completely free. When covering 
Islam, According to Kareem, they want to dig up something, send a message or show that 
this is how the Muslims are. However, their intention is never in purely helping the society 
and Muslims in Finland. He feels that this should be changed.  
Kareem continues that for an innocent street person or for the youth in general, it is 
difficult to understand what is happening, because they don’t have the ability to see the 
true nature of the media. Kareem feels that they sensationalize the issue and concentrate on 
showing people what they want to see, instead of trying to find solutions to the problems. 
In addition, according to Kareem, the Finnish media lye too much on academic opinions, 
which are confusing for the regular media consumer.  
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Abdullah puts emphasis on the responsibility of the media, because according to him, the 
media is presently doing a lot of harm.  However, he feels that sometimes the media does 
good things also, but the information is not always correct. This is problematic, because 
the wrong information is taken in by those who are planning to go, and then they will base 
their thinking on incorrect information.  
They see it from the media that the Muslims are being oppressed – maybe it’s not 
so? It’s above our control. We can do nothing. 
Abdullah 
 
Ali agrees with the other respondents in emphasizing the responsibility of the media. He 
points out that we need more responsible, neutral and objective journalism. According to 
Ali, this kind of more responsible media is disappearing from Finland as the situation has 
gotten worse after the year 2000 - these days, the media is always looking to sensationalize 
things; it produces aggravating and overemphasizing journalism.  
Ali argues that in the media, there are more and more of unnecessary headlines labelling a 
whole religion, race, or community negatively because of the actions of one person. 
According to Ali, terms like jihadist or radical Islam only create more confrontations. Ali 
emphasizes that the media has caused confrontations towards Islam and Muslims. He states 
that the overgeneralizing way to produce news has raised questions and discussion in his 
community, and that this generalizing rhetoric only makes things worse. 
If a Muslim does a crime, why is it mentioned that this person is a Muslim?! 
Ali 
 
According to Ahmad, the media gives a wrong image of Islam. In his opinion, the media is 
trying to make the image dark, so that people would start hating Islam. He gives an 
example stating that there is never a program on television about the true teachings of 
Islam or the Messenger, and that there is only news about what someone has done, even if 
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this person is not even a true Muslim. Ahmad argues that these people who commit crimes 
in the name of Islam are not true Muslims, and thus they should not be taken as an example 
of Islam. 
When a Muslim commits a crime, he is a terrorist for the media. And when a non-
Muslim commits a crime, you will either say that he is a drunk or he is a psycho. 
Ahmad 
 
Ahmad argues that this negative image of Islam might create hatred among some Muslims, 
and some will want to revenge and eventually join terrorist groups. At this point of the 
discussion, I sense that Ahmad is frustrated. 
Show me a Muslim who is not frustrated! Any Muslim! All of us we are 
frustrated. But this frustration, we don’t bring it up with terror. We keep it to 
ourselves. We know that we are supported by God. 
Ahmad 
 
 
4.3.4 The future of the phenomenon  
We hope that we will be able to bypass this challenge, and my worry is that every 
day the world is changing. My fear is that the world is taking us by surprise. 
Kareem 
 
Some of the respondents were more pessimistic about the future of this issue than others. 
Caleb, for example, states that as long as we are not discussing the real problems, it will be 
hard  to  interfere  with  this  issue.  He  sees  that  this  phenomenon  is  tightly  connected  to  
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global politics and because we are talking about strategic and geopolitically significant 
zones, things will turn into much worse before they start to get better. 
Kareem argues that it is time to believe that things are not like they used to be, and that the 
future  will  depend  on  the  way  we  take  over  our  current  challenges.  He  emphasizes  that  
Finland should have its own thinking in dealing with these issues and not copy from other 
countries, because in order to deal with our own problem, we need to dig deeper and 
develop our own system. 
According to Amina, one of the most important things to reflect upon in the future is, how 
to engage Muslims in this society, how to make them feel that they belong into this society. 
Amina argues that when the immigrants move here they will feel that everything is 
different, and start to think about ways to protect themselves and ways to operate in this 
society. She accentuates the importance of a succeeding social integration plan.  
We people are in the end very similar in our basic needs. We work on the same 
reflexes and patterns. This is something the general public should also understand 
– those other people are not that different from us, things just appear in different 
ways, depending on your culture of origin. 
Amina 
 
Amina argues that she is worried about the spinelessness of our politicians when they 
continue to ignore their responsibilities. Her opinion is that all extremist movements 
should be placed on same line and talked about out loud. It should be made perfectly clear 
that these kinds of ideologies and movements are not acceptable in Finland.  
In a way I am very frightened about the future. I hope we can make a change and 
people would understand that we should not in Finland follow the same road as 
other countries have taken – – It all really depends on what goes on around the 
world and the media has a huge influence in how they want to promote some 
things or not. They have much more influence than do the politicians. This is how 
I see it. 
Amina 
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Amina argues that the capitalization and the growing inequalities will have an effect. Her 
prognosis is that Finland will witness a growing number of extremist groups due to the fact 
that  some  people  feel  that  they  are  victims  of  unjust  treatment  and  that  they  don’t  have  
same kind of opportunities than others. She continues to state that probably the 
radicalization of Muslims will not pose such a big threat to Finland, because here Muslims 
are such a small minority. However, she finds the growth of other extremist movements as 
a possible and more probable threat for the peace of the society.  
Ahmad and Abdullah both argue that the future for Muslims in Finland is good. Abdullah 
states that if religious leaders are given a chance to do more by being put in a good position 
with the authorities; this would make the Muslims know that the authorities are doing 
something good with the leaders. And then they would listen to the leaders. 
But if we are only left to sit and watch, then we think that there is nothing we can 
do. 
Abdullah 
 
 
4.4 Reporting the findings of the analysis: The subcategories  
 
4.4.1 Injustice suffered by Muslims 
The West plays a big role in the whole issue. 
Abdullah 
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The idea of the injustice suffered by the Muslims is significantly connected to the notion of 
the umma, the unity of all Muslims around the world. This same idea is elevated by one of 
the interviewees, Caleb, who argues that the concept of the umma is tightly related to the 
mutual feeling of injustice shared by all Muslims. He explains the umma as being 
something that belongs to the Islamic tradition. It is about the connection and cohesion of 
the Islamic community, the Muslims, all around the world. He mentions that this 
connection is strong in the psyche of a Muslim. 
According to Ali, one of the key elements behind radicalization is the Western foreign 
politics, which in his opinion has contrasting principles. He justifies this by pointing out 
that those who have left to the conflict zone always cite issues about Western foreign 
politics in their postings in social media or in the videos they have made (similar remarks 
have been by Goerzig & Al-Hashimi 2015, 114). He continues on the issue by stating that 
in the Muslim communities, there can be detected a negative image of Western politics 
towards Muslims. From his perception, it seems that this really is the overall attitude 
within the Muslim communities. The marginal position of Finland in the Western foreign 
politics is acknowledged, but it still has an effect on the general Finnish Muslim audience.  
Abdullah argues that the role of the West in the issue of Muslim radicalization is 
significant. He states that if the West would be concerned of what is happening with the 
war in Syria, it would finish fast. According to Abdullah, the West is the one who is 
providing the weapons, and hence it is in their interest to see the fighting going on.  
So you cannot ask a Muslim: “why do you go to fight?” when what is happening 
over there. They see what is happening there, the killing day and night. The issue 
of  people  going  there  (to  conflict  zones  to  fight)  is  being  caused  by  –  –  the  
influence of the Western world. 
Abdullah 
 
Abdullah claims that Muslims join the battles worldwide, because they want to help their 
Muslim brothers and because they have the feeling that they need help. People see the wars 
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in the media, and connect them with Islam. Abdullah claims that this affects the Muslims 
in general, and they feel the need to help their brothers and sisters, because they are being 
oppressed.  
But most of the wars have nothing to do with Islam; they only have to do with 
people who are Muslims. That’s all. 
Abdullah 
 
He argues that a Muslim who has a good knowledge about Islam might also go to fight, 
precisely  due  to  his  far  understanding  of  the  religion.  He  understands  that  Muslims  are  
being oppressed and he wants to help his Muslim brothers and sisters. 
We all see what is happening in the television – we see how people are dying in 
Syria, everywhere. So when someone who has a true understanding of Islam sees 
this and understands that Muslims are suffering, it will make him wonder: “Why 
am I here when my brothers are suffering?” 
Abdullah 
 
Ahmad, on the other hand, elevates the issue by arguing that Muslims will react when they 
hear about what is happening in the Muslim world, with Muslims being killed everywhere. 
He states that this will make some people angry and they will get a sense of revenge and 
anger towards the non-Muslims.  
The Muslims feel like, I am innocent, we are innocent, they are killing us, but still 
we are the bad guys. 
Ahmad 
 
Ahmad brings up three interconnecting themes affecting behind the phenomenon of 
radicalization: the media, the Western foreign politics and the notion of Islam as the 
enemy. On the notion of Islam as the enemy, Ahmad states that it is all about history 
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repeating itself. He justifies this by explaining that first the enemies of the West were the 
Koreans, then the Russians and after the Cold War a new enemy had to be created. This 
new enemy became Islam. He points out that in the global politics there is a constant need 
for an enemy, because it maintains the arm trade. Now why was Islam chosen as the 
enemy? Ahmad’s opinion about this is clear:  
It’s because Islam is increasing in the whole world, and the West don’t want that. 
“We have to stop it and start giving a bad image of Muslims!” 
Ahmad 
 
Caleb mentions Western foreign politics, oppression, terror images and the feelings of 
injustice  as  reasons  why  the  Muslims  want  to  react  and  as  one  of  the  reasons  for  
radicalization. Caleb wants to emphasize that this is how the Muslims truly feel. The 
feelings of unjust treatment, for example, that they are being oppressed, that innocent 
Muslim civilians are killed in drone strikes, and that Muslim prisoners are being tortured in 
Western prisons, are prominent within the Muslim communities. Caleb continues on 
stating that Western countries have double-standards – because at the same time when they 
are  demonizing  some  organizations,  they  seem  to  forget  about  their  own  violations  of  
human rights. He argues, however, that it is dangerous to try to suppress these feelings of 
injustice. Rather they should be taken seriously. 
Because if you study and follow what kind of reasons for their actions these 
people who have left to, let’s say Syria and Iraq, have given. Or when they do 
their videos where they say what they are doing and why, for example a suicide 
bombing. Then Western foreign policy is very often mentioned as a motive. As 
long as all this is will not be taken into account, I think the whole issue of 
preventing violent extremism is just about empty rhetoric. This feeling is very 
strong and creates this so-called radicalization. It is completely understandable, in 
my opinion. Not acceptable, but understandable. 
Caleb 
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Caleb and Ali both put emphasis on the young generations, who want to see a change, and 
are thus especially vulnerable for religious rhetoric. This rhetoric is influential, because by 
using it, it is possible to win people on one’s side even though the arguments would not 
make that much sense or be logical. Especially vulnerable for this kind of rhetoric are those 
who are already in that state of mind where they want to see changes – in a state where one 
feels that he or his Muslim brothers or sisters have suffered from injustice.  
Caleb wants to emphasize that the reality is that most Muslims are aware of this injustice, 
but they also understand that one injustice cannot be defeated with another. And this 
understanding will protect many from joining violent political activities. And thus Caleb 
feels that, in fact, we are finally talking about a marginal problem or phenomenon. 
Amina agrees with Caleb and points out that it is a small part of Muslims who radicalize. 
But  sometimes  she  wonders  why  the  radicalizing  part  can  be  so  small,  when  there  is  so  
much poverty and unjust living conditions in all Muslim countries. Amina points out that 
here in Finland, and in other Western countries, it is easier to think about these things, 
when we have that much time in our hands. Amina points out that all these things affect the 
person and might in the end drive this person into radical action.  
Kareem argues that when thinking about what has been happening in countries like Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Sudan, or Chechnya. And when pointing out all the actions carried out in 
major Islamic societies: 
It seems that Islam has become the enemy of the West. Because how do you 
explain that not one, not two, but the majority of Islamic countries are being 
targeted – Either politically or economically. 
Kareem 
 
However,  Kareem  points  out  that  this  argument  is  a  challenge  for  our  society.  Mainly  
because the Muslim youth and families here don’t understand that what they see happening 
around the world should not be linked in the way they grew up to be Muslims in the 
Finnish society. 
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Maybe in Iraq, Israel or Palestine – but what about people living in a society 
where they have free education? And yet they don’t respect it. 
Kareem 
 
 
4.4.2 Underlying reasons for radicalization 
Even though it was never the main goal of this study to search for specific reasons for 
radicalization,  in  order  to  get  a  coherent  picture  of  the  whole  study,  it  is  essential  to  
provide here some of the respondents’ thoughts on the matter.  
 
Western foreign policy  
When discussing the possible reasons behind the radicalization process, Ali wants to point 
out that there are several factors which might be seen as affecting on this process, and that 
it  is  always  case-specific.  However,  he  argues  that  one  of  the  key  elements  behind  
radicalization is the Western foreign politics, which is explicitly expressed in the 
propaganda of the Islamist extremist movements (see more in 5.4.1. Injustice suffered by 
the Muslims).  
Caleb finds similarly the Western foreign politics, oppression, terror images and the 
feelings of injustice as some of the reasons for radicalization. Abdullah agrees and claims 
that Muslims join the battles worldwide, because they want to help their Muslim brothers 
and because they have the feeling that they need help.  
 
Social bonds and like-minded groups  
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Kareem and Abdullah both see the importance of like-minded groups as one of the 
enabling factors behind radicalization. Abdullah argues that the one who is planning to go 
might not express his feelings to his friends and family, but he might have found new 
peers, other Muslims who share the same ideology. Kareem takes this argument further by 
stating that radicalization hasn’t got much to do with the family or school of the person, 
but rather the youth get the radical information from their networks, a specific person, or a 
preacher.20 Kareem highlights the fact that the flow of information when it comes to Islam 
is impossible to organize and the youth are always eager for anything new.  
It has something to do with some inside hidden circle, that only a few individuals 
can have the eye to penetrate and understand. 
Kareem 
 
 
Insufficient or good knowledge about Islam?  
Abdullah emphasizes the fact that making the decision of leaving to fight at a conflict zone 
might not necessarily mean that the person hasn’t got sufficient knowledge about Islam; 
rather it can mean the opposite.  
They may even understand it better than the one who doesn’t go. Let me put it 
that way. 
Abdullah 
 
He argues that a Muslim who has a good knowledge about Islam might also go to fight, 
precisely  due  to  his  far  understanding  of  the  religion.  He  understands  that  Muslims  are  
                                               
20 The importance of like-minded networks and social bonds in the radicalization phenomenon and in 
recruiting for radical groups has been demonstrated e.g. by Marc Sageman, a Senior Fellow of the Foreign 
Policy Research Institute and a scholar of Terrorism Studies, in his book Understanding Terror Networks 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). Similar conclusion can be found in the studies of 
Juha Saarinen, a researcher on Violent Islamism and Political Violence 
(http://ulkopolitist.fi/2015/03/10/vakivaltainen-islamismi-ja-sosiaaliset-verkostot/). 
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being oppressed and he wants to help his Muslim brothers and sisters. Abdullah compares 
this  with  a  Muslim who is  ignorant  in  his  religion,  and  sees  the  jihad  only  as  a  physical  
fight with weapons. According to Abdullah, this person has the wrong understanding.21  
But yet they both go to the conflict zone to fight, depending on the information they 
receive from the battleground. Ahmed, on the contrary, claims that those who have left to 
the conflict zone to fight might have lost the true meaning of Islam.  
This is not Islam, it’s evil. I don’t call this Islam. 
Ahmad 
 
As Abdullah pointed out, radicalization in the Islamic context and leaving to fight at a 
conflict zone might not be due to the insufficient knowledge of Islam. He claims that rather 
it’s about the personal needs of all conflicting parties involved. He explains it by stating 
that the need and the aim are usually not the same for those who are calling for help, and 
those who are coming for help. The first one fights because of his own interest and 
position, whereas the second will fight because of his own religion and conscience.  
So the Muslim who has good knowledge about Islam, going to Iraq or Syria – – to 
fight for Islam, is going to realize that he is not fighting for Muslims, but for the 
interests of someone else.  
Abdullah 
 
Who is radicalizing?  
Abdullah claims that usually it is the young people who decide to leave, because others 
have responsibilities. According to Abdullah, this is especially true for the immigrant 
Muslims, who generally still have close ties to their countries of origin and might be 
supporting their families there financially. Hence they are not interested in leaving their 
position in Finland to go to fight in another country.  
                                               
21 Abdullah explains that the true meaning of the jihad is to strive, to make something bad to become good in 
you. See glossary for more information. 
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Amina,  on  the  contrary,  claims  that  it  is  more  probable  that  the  people  who  move  from  
Islamic countries to Finland to radicalize in their religion. She argues that first of all, 
Muslim immigrants moving to Finland sense a longing for safety, when they “notice that 
maybe not all people like having you here, and maybe all is not so well as you thought it 
would be”. Second of all, problems might arise if they encounter racism. Since according 
to  Amina,  racism  is  clearly  one  of  the  most  important  factors  why  people  choose  to  go  
further away and separate themselves from the society. And in Amina’s opinion, these 
things might explain why some Muslims then choose to join some movements or groups 
where all are already alike. These groups stay in their own circles and appear as attractive 
for Muslims who feel alienated from the society.  
Amina wants to still emphasize that there are as many stories as there are people. And in 
her opinion, this reality should be expressed more out in the open. Finnish young people 
radicalize just as well as Muslim ones. 
We have quite a big lot of radical Finnish youngsters, they are not going 
anywhere, but instead they choose to drink themselves dead. For those who have 
left (to fight in the conflict zone), it’s their way to express themselves when they 
leave. 
Amina 
 
 
The state of abnormality  
Amina argues that the Muslim communities have a feeling of living constantly in a state of 
abnormality. According to her, for a Muslim this is visible in everyday life’s normal 
matters. Especially with children, because then it is necessary to constantly think of places 
where you can visit with children and whether they serve halal-food. She states that it is a 
stress factor for the children as well. 
Me as a Finnish Muslim, maybe I am in a slightly easier position, but if you think 
about an immigrant Muslim – – many things can come as a surprise. This person 
might not understand that the stores are not fully equipped with some halal 
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products and wonder why something happened to their child. Like: “Why my 
child has been eating pork for one year in school without me knowing about it!” 
It’s about these little things. 
Amina 
 
Amina continues by reminiscing her family holiday in a Muslim country where even the 
children feel at ease and have a sense of belonging to the surrounding society because 
everyone understands them, they are not seen as freaks anymore, even though they are 
wearing headscarves. She continues by pointing out that here in Finland people want 
Muslims to be separated from the society, to be placed in their own box:  
You are Muslim women with your scarves, stay put right where you are! 
Amina 
 
Amina argues that the society doesn’t always think about that part, but she continues by 
saying that she understands it, because Muslims are such a small minority in Finland. But 
still she states that this has an effect on Muslims in general, because they have to live under 
these circumstances. And in Amina’s opinion, these things might explain why some 
Muslims then choose to join some movements or groups where all are already alike.  
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5 KEY FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Radicalization phenomenon within the Muslim communities in the Helsinki 
metropolitan area  
According to the analysis of the research interviews, it can be concluded that there are 
several factors present when defining the phenomenon of radicalization in a Muslim 
context in the Helsinki metropolitan area. These factors are, respectively: Political 
grievances, the Youth, the Media, Social exclusion, and Polarization of the society. These 
elements in their various forms are interconnected and intertwined in shaping and 
sustaining the phenomenon. 
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1. Diagram 1, demonstrates the factors present in defining the phenomenon of 
radicalization in the context of Muslim communities residing in the Helsinki 
metropolitan area.  
 
When analysing the elements which are present when defining the radicalization 
phenomenon  within  an  Islamic  context  –  and  more  specifically,  the  context  of  Muslims  
living in the Helsinki metropolitan area – it becomes evident that these elements are 
varying and numerous. Therefore, this diagram does not exclude other possible factors, and 
its intention is not to act as a general explanation of the radicalization phenomenon. Rather, 
it attempts to enhance the understanding of the complex nature of the phenomenon in this 
specific context. 
Since the phenomenon of radicalization is indeed complex and case-specific, it has 
provoked several analytical attempts to grasp the nature of the underlying contributing 
factors. Magnus Ranstorp (2010, 4) divides these contributing elements into two separate 
dimensions: the internal and the external. In his division the internal factors relate mainly 
to: “a prevailing lack of public Muslim debate about the justification of violence; 
polarizing public rhetoric and stigmatization and political polarization; identity crisis; 
alienation from society; the presence of radical imams; glorification of jihad and 
martyrdom; youths trapped in a downward spiral of discrimination, stigmatization and 
criminalization – making them susceptible to recruitment efforts”.  
Whereas, the external dimension refers to the perception of shared injustice suffered by 
Muslims globally and locally, which is result of the perceived double-standards of Western 
foreign policy and Western military interventions, as a radicalizing factor. According to 
Ranstorp (2010, 4), these two dimensions, the internal and the external, both put emphasis 
on grievances and discontent. However, they are interchangeable in nature; the global and 
personal grievances intertwine and blur their fine borderline, which can possibly result in 
perceiving the personal grievance as causal product of the external factor.   
Both of these dimensions are distinguishably demonstrable in the interview material 
analysed for this study. Even though some of the factors presented by Ranstorp (2010) are 
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not explicitly pronounced in the interviews as contributing elements for radicalization, 
most of them are included in the discussions. In this next section of the Analysis chapter, I 
introduce the factors which contribute in the radicalization phenomenon within an Islamic 
context. Additionally, this section will provide points of view on how this phenomenon is 
perceived in the Muslim communities residing in the Helsinki metropolitan area.  
 
5.1.1 Political grievances  
You have to be blind if you don’t see that this has a big effect. 
Caleb 
 
The element of political grievances is present in all of the interview discussions with the 
respondents. It was not initially designed as a discussion topic, but it proved to be a 
substantial factor in this study because all of the respondents referred to it freely and 
spontaneously when discussing their feelings of injustice and the role of ‘the West’ in it. 
The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  outline  the  importance  of  political  grievances  as  a  
contributing  factor  in  the  radicalization  phenomenon,  and  to  present  a  summary  of  the  
respondents’ viewpoints on this matter. 
The notion of political grievances has been introduced in several studies concerning 
radicalization. In this research, it refers to the perceived feeling of unjust treatment 
suffered by fellow Muslims globally and locally. The grievances invoke a persisting sense 
for the Muslim observer that the West is oppressing the Muslim world by conducting 
“crusades”  against  its  culture  and  beliefs.  This  crusade  discourse  is  seen  to  be  explicitly  
demonstrated in for instance the invasion of Iraq, US support for Israel and the French and 
Danish cartoons. This suffering is seen as the result of Western neo-imperialism and veiled 
colonialism in the form of Western foreign policy in Muslim countries. These grievances 
have mostly a symbolic importance to those Muslims, who live in the Western world. Yet, 
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it is still a prominent and pervasive discourse, and a source of anger and frustration within 
the Muslim communities and it acts as a contributing element in the radicalization 
phenomenon. (Gerges, 2007; Goerzig & Al-Hashimi 2015, 114–118; Nesser 2010, 93; 
Ranstorp 2010, 11) 
Interestingly enough, even if Huntington’s infamous idea of the clash of civilizations has 
been widely contested within the academia and some politicians as baseless, oversimplified 
and prophetic (see Introduction, p.7 and chapter on Islam vs. the West, p.17), it still serves 
as a prominent argument to some Muslims and indeed to some non-Muslims, as well. This 
notion of a perceived polarization between ‘the West’ and the Muslims is symbiotic in 
relation to political grievances: they reinforce each other. (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi 2015, 
118)  
In  this  study,  all  of  the  interview  respondents  emphasized  the  role  of  the  feelings  of  
injustice and unequal treatment of Muslims as crucial factors in the radicalization 
phenomenon. These feelings combined with the negative and critical image of Western 
foreign policy towards Muslims seem to be a common perception, even an overall attitude, 
in some Muslim communities. The respondents often referred to the notion of Muslims 
being oppressed around the world, and according to some of the respondents, this creates 
frustration, hatred, anger, and even a sense of revenge towards the non-Muslims.  
 
5.1.2 The Youth  
Is something missing? Are we losing in the way we deal with our youth? 
Kareem 
 
Some academics argue that radicalization is a process of the adoption of radical behavior 
and ideas leading to terrorist activities especially common for the youth, and hence 
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radicalization can be viewed as characteristic for youth development (Jackson 2005; 
Kullberg 2011, 290; Sageman 2004). Some of the interview respondents agree with this 
notion in the sense that, according to them, the youth play a significant role as an element 
in defining the radicalization phenomenon. Even though the respondents approach this 
issue from different angles, they all agree that the youth are in different ways involved with 
this issue. The most common argument made about the youth is that they are most likely to 
radicalize due to several different reasons. These reasons are introduced below. 
One of the interviewees argues that the youth usually feel as being part of this society, and 
thus it is difficult to understand what prompts these young people to leave and to betray 
their families by going to another country to fight. However, this idea is challenged by 
another respondent who argues that the Muslim youth feel more socially excluded from the 
society than their non-Muslim peers. Nevertheless, most argue that the youth are living in 
their own world totally and that they are anxious to try new things. This might partly 
explain their eagerness to leave their comfort zones and go seek for adventures. Another 
explanation is their lack of responsibilities. One respondent refers to this as the enabling 
factor, because young people don’t have as much responsibilities, like spouses or children, 
to take care of and hence they can more freely leave. However, according to the Finnish 
Security Intelligence Service (SUPO), it has been reported that whole families have left 
Finland to the conflict zones.22 Thus even people with responsibilities, in that sense, might 
be ready to leave. 
Some of the respondents emphasize the role of the intergenerational conflict, or the 
generational change, in this issue. The notion of intergenerational conflict relies on the idea 
that the second and third generations of Muslim youth living in the West are in a different 
position compared to their parents, because they need to face the demands of two parallel 
cultures; the traditional culture maintained by their parents’ generation, i.e. the culture they 
are living at home, and the culture outside their homes, such as in school. This creates an 
identity crisis for the young Muslims, who need to constantly define, alter and switch 
identities in their lives. (Buijs, Hamdy & Demant 2006; Goerzig and Al-Hashimi, 2015; 
Roy, 2004) 
                                               
22 http://yle.fi/uutiset/supo_isis-alueelle_lahtenyt_suomesta_yli_60__mukana_kokonaisia_perheita/7827731 
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According to one respondent, this identity crisis should be mended by offering guidance in 
constructing  a  stronger  Muslim  identity.  He  states  that  the  Muslim  youth  are  more  
vulnerable for example to the propaganda of the Islamist extremist movements, because 
their Muslim identity is not strong enough. Another interviewee puts emphasis on the fact 
that some of the Muslim families don’t even know their children, because they are living in 
an illusion that their children behave similarly at home and outside it. He gives an example 
stating that even if they would dress in appropriate Islamic clothing at home, they will 
surely change into a more Westernized outfit the minute they leave outside.  
This notion is similarly emphasized by some scholars, such as Goerzig and Al-Hashimi 
(2015), who seek to understand for example why the second and third generations of 
European Muslims are more probable to radicalize than their parents. Some scholars, on 
the other hand, have focused on offering intergenerational conflict as a causal factor behind 
radicalization. For example Olivier Roy (2004) argues that extremist Salafi ideologies offer 
the  abstract  global  Muslim  community,  the  Umma,  as  a  point  of  identification  for  those  
second-generation Muslims who are experiencing an intergenerational conflict and thus 
have difficulties in finding their place between the traditional culture offered by their 
parents and the Western culture surrounding them outside their homes. 
When discussing the ways in which it could be possible to affect the minds of the youth, 
the role of the Muslim youth organizations is accentuated. They have an important role in 
both providing the youth with meaningful activities with their Muslim peers, and giving 
them a sense of belonging and empowering them. One of the respondents emphasizes the 
fact that there are not enough Finnish speaking imams in the Muslim communities. This 
creates a problematic situation for those young people, who would be keen to receive 
guidance and religious teaching but who are comfortable with only Finnish language.  
Additionally, one of the respondents argues that because young people are usually 
interested in new things, something current is needed to convince them. It is necessary to 
make reasonable conversations with the youth about the realities of life – on education, 
their own parents, children, and their role in this. Because telling the youth not to kill or 
not to do something will only make them say they know this better. The respondent states 
that  a  lot  of  interaction  with  the  youth  is  needed,  and  that  they  should  be  present  in  all  
cooperative initiatives with the authorities. But he admits that it is difficult to control the 
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young Muslims, because according to him, they don’t do anything open and that’s why it is 
difficult to see it in them.  
You don’t know what they think and they won’t openly challenge you, because 
they have their own understanding in their minds, and they will not expose it to 
you. They say they are the new generation and anything I know is from the past. 
They’re thinking is quite different and we need to work much to make them 
understand. 
Abdullah 
 
5.1.3 The Media  
Finland is a neutral country. But when you ask the people in the streets what they 
think of Islam – – they will let you know that Islam is a religion of terror. And 
who give you this kind of message: it’s the media. And who makes us terrorists: 
it’s the media. 
Ahmad 
 
All of the interview respondents highlighted the fact that the media has a significant role in 
defining the radicalization phenomenon within an Islamic context. They all put emphasis 
on the responsibility the media has when producing news about Islam and radicalization. 
They criticize the media for sensationalizing headlines and overemphasizing issues, which 
are questionable in importance. Some even argue that it has given a totally wrong, and 
mostly negative, image about Islam. According to the respondents, there are never positive 
news  about  Islam  in  the  media,  only  images  of  terror,  incorrect  information  and  unclear  
terminology. 
These impressions are not only a matter of subjective perception, as demonstrated by many 
studies over the years. In fact, Tuomas Martikainen argues that the image of Islam in the 
media is revolving around violence, conflicts and its supposedly aggressive nature. 
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Nevertheless, Islam continues to be a prominent part of the Finnish public debate. 
Consequently, the public opinion in Finland concerning the Muslims and Islam is generally 
negative, as expressed by the latest opinion poll from 2008, stating that those Finns who 
view Islam negatively represented 52% of the population, whereas a positive stance was 
taken only by 6%. (Martikainen 2013, 245-246) 
Some of the interviewees argue that this affects both the Muslim and the non-Muslim 
public. According to a respondent, it makes some of the Muslims angry and frustrated; 
when at the same time the non-Muslims might base their information about Muslims on a 
misrepresented picture of Islam. Some respondents see this situation as an underlying 
reason for the negative and aggressive commenting in the public Internet discussions and 
under Internet news articles. Some argued that the change in attitudes towards Islam and 
Muslims has become more visible in these public Internet comments as they appear to be 
increasingly hostile. One of the interviewees even stated that these Internet discussions can 
be seen as an example of the polarization of the society. 
Similar acknowledgments have been made by Goerzig and Al-Hashimi (2015), who argue 
that the perceived cultural differences between Islam and the West, especially with issues 
related to practicing religion, are overemphasized in the media. This ultimately contributes 
to the misinterpretations and misunderstandings about Islam as a religion. According to 
Goerzig and Al-Hashimi, Islam is depicted in the discourses created by the media as being 
equivalent to religious extremism and yet if a Muslim would want to criticize this, it’s 
interpreted as terrorism sympathizing. Moreover, the media continues to give jihadists 
extensive attention, which has resulted in a situation where the public opinion associates 
terrorism in Europe automatically to breed from the Islamic faith. (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi 
2015, 3–4; 48; 56) 
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5.1.4 Social exclusion  
Some  of  the  respondents  argue  that  unemployment  and  the  feeling  of  alienation  that  
follows can be seen as defining factors for radicalization for some people. When some turn 
to alcohol and drugs, others might seek for religion as something to fill the feeling of 
emptiness in their lives. One interviewee finds it difficult to understand why it is not 
considered that the common feelings of injustice and unequal treatment among the 
Muslims really affect the way Muslims think about life and their ability to handle things. 
Moreover these feelings can provoke Muslims to separate themselves from the society. 
Muslims may have been through more than some other people – – Some might 
seek for religiosity and think that through this when I am very strong in my 
religion; I don’t have to bother with the society anymore. 
Amina 
 
One of the respondents claims that other catalysts for radicalization are for instance, 
alienation from the society and lack of education and jobs. Contradicting to these 
statements, another respondent is not convinced about the direct causal link between 
marginalization and radicalization: 
Marginalization is often mentioned as a reason for radicalization. However, it 
cannot be generalized, because many, who have experienced this social exclusion, 
have not radicalized. 
Ali 
 
This argument is shared Rabasa and Benard (2014, 1–2; 4). They claim that one of the 
persisting arguments continues to be that marginalization and lack of integration of 
European Muslims could be seen as a causal mobilizing factor for Islamic radicalization 
and even for the increase of Islamist terrorism. Yet, they contest this by arguing that 
according to their studies on the backgrounds of those involved in plotting terrorist attacks 
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in Europe, they have reached the conclusion that even though most of these individuals 
could be seen as well integrated, they still committed violent attacks in the societies they 
belonged to. And furthermore, the researchers emphasize that most of the European 
Muslims are “neither well integrated nor radicalized”. However, according to Peter 
Waldmann,  a  Professor  Emeritus  of  Sociology  and  an  expert  on  Terrorism;  Matenia  
Sirseloudi, a Terrorism studies researcher; and Stefan Malthaner, a researcher on Political 
Violence: social marginalization (as well as discrimination, and identity and orientation 
problems) can be seen as a common issue for young Muslims living in the West, and thus 
possibly contributing to the radicalization phenomenon. (Waldmann, Sirseloudi & 
Malthaner 2010, 63–64)  
Corresponding arguments have been made by Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Senior 
Intelligence Analysts for NYPD Intelligence Division, who claim that e.g. social 
alienation, discrimination or economic marginalization, are part of the self-identification 
phase of their model for radicalization process.23 Heikki Kerkkänen, a sociologist and an 
expert in multiculturalism, however partly questions this by introducing the notion of 
“discourse of social exclusion”, which maintains the social ideal of an active citizen. 
Hence, if a person is not able to fulfill these requirements, he is automatically seen as 
potential threat and thus needs to be governed by “soft actions” (Kerkkänen 2013, 45).  
 
5.1.5 Polarization of the society  
Many  of  the  respondents  expressed  their  worries  about  the  polarization  of  the  society.  
According to them, polarization of the society and the excess in extreme thinking are 
prominent drivers for the radicalization phenomenon, because they juxtapose and create 
hatred between communities. Categorizing individuals and producing discourses enhance 
the development of a radicalization process. One of the interviewees even pointed out that 
the first thing that comes to his mind when addressing radicalization is the polarized 
                                               
23 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, p. 6–7 
(http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf) 
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society we are living in. He states that extremist thinking is becoming increasingly popular, 
and that it is a real threat to the society and to multiculturalism.   
Two of the respondents emphasize the responsibility of the media in creating polarizing 
discourses and hence feeding to the excess of extremist thinking. They stress, for example, 
that the recent media coverage on radicalization has constructed a false impression for the 
general public, implying that mosques serve only as recruiting arenas for terrorist 
organizations. Furthermore, most of the interviewees place the blame on media for 
connecting Islam and Muslims particularly to terrorism and radicalization, and thus 
building a gap between Muslims and the rest of the society.  
Moreover, the informants accentuated the responsibility of the politicians in creating and 
sustaining the polarization of the society. They advise the leaders of societies to take the 
polarization of the society more seriously. In addition, the politicians should be more 
careful with their rhetoric in order to avoid encouraging extremist discourses. This view is 
shared by Frank Buijs, Atef Hamdy and Froukje Demant in their study (2006) exploring 
the young Dutch Muslims’ political views. In their research it is demonstrated that the 
negative image of Islam in the Netherlands reinforce the radicalization phenomenon within 
the  Dutch  Muslim  youth.  They  argue  that  both  of  the  juxtaposed  opposing  ends  of  
extremism, Islamic extremism and right-wing populists, are closely connected in 
maintaining each other. Consequently, there is a constant need for balancing in policy-
making in order to ensure that neither one of the opposing poles is not unintentionally 
favored. The research ultimately stresses the power of the politicians in contributing to the 
division of the society by stating stigmatizing comments concerning religious or ethnic 
minorities. The polarizing contribution is particularly obvious when these comments are 
stated by politicians in the wake of a violent incident.   
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5.2 Dealing with the radicalization phenomenon 
Before we didn’t face these challenges. Now the challenges are coming all the 
time. We should stop only to think about making money and start to focus on 
solving problems. Now, and not tomorrow. Tomorrow might be too late. 
Kareem 
 
During the time of writing this thesis, many new initiatives tackling the issue of 
radicalization have started across the country, such as the Young Muslim’s Forum in 
Finland’s efforts in preventing radicalization and crime.24 Furthermore, Finn Church Aid 
has started a campaign called Tekoja Väkivaltaista Radikalisoitumista Vastaan (Acts 
against violent radicalization)25 to address these issues on a high national level. This 
campaign addresses the matter of violent extremism and radicalization, and it is being 
undertaken by the Finn Church Aid in cooperation with the Finnish Ministry of Internal 
affairs.26 Similarly, according to the findings of this research, the study of radicalization as 
well as relevant counter-radicalization initiatives would benefit of more cooperation 
between the authorities and the local communities –- considering that common 
understanding and trust are the most important points in building a collective ground for 
discussion and openings for future research.  
Fortunately, the police and city of Helsinki have made significant contributions in 
enhancing the cooperation efforts between the Muslim communities and the authorities.27 
According to the informants of this study, these initiatives are welcomed within the 
Muslim  communities.  However,  some  of  the  respondents  questioned  the  effects  of  these  
                                               
24 Nuorten Muslimien Foorumi: Radikaalisuuden ehkäisy ja rikollisuuden vähentäminen, 
http://nmf.fi/meista/toiminta/ (accessed 25 Oct, 2015) 
25 Tekoja Väkivaltaista Radikalisoitumista Vastaan (Acts against violent radicalization), 
https://www.tekojakampanja.fi/ (accessed 25 Oct, 2015) 
26 Sisäministeriö ja Kirkon Ulkomaanapu yhteistyöhön väkivaltaisen radikalisaation ehkäisemiseksi 
Suomessa, 
http://www.intermin.fi/sisainenturvallisuus/ajankohtaista/1/0/sisaministerio_ja_kirkon_ulkomaanapu_yhteist
yohon_vakivaltaisen_radikalisaation_ehkaisemiseksi_suomessa_59475 (accessed 25 Oct, 2015) 
27 Helsingin sunnit ja shiiat keskustelivat radikalismista, http://www.hs.fi/kaupunki/a1410661631417 
(accessed 25 Oct, 2015); Helsingin kaupunki vierailee moskeijoissa, tavoitteena tiedottaa ja tavoittaa, 
http://yle.fi/uutiset/helsingin_kaupunki_vierailee_moskeijoissa_tavoitteena_tiedottaa_ja_tavoittaa/8384056 
(accessed 25 Oct, 2015) 
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cooperative meetings, and especially the lack of Muslim youth present in them. This 
research has demonstrated that the aspect of youth in the radicalization phenomenon 
should not be neglected. Hence, the youth should be more inclusively incorporated in all of 
the preventive measures and activities designed. 
The role of the youth in the radicalization phenomenon is emphasized by many researchers 
(see p.74 in this study). According to the research results of this thesis, it can be concluded 
that the youth also hold a potential of contributing to the preventive matters of this 
phenomenon. As it is contemplated in the chapter of Political grievances in this study 
(p.72), the perceived injustice suffered by fellow Muslims is a prominent and prevailing 
discourse within the Muslim communities. Similar acknowledgements have been made by 
the sociologist, Marion Van San, whose recently published journal article demonstrates 
that young Dutch and Belgian Muslims maintain the discourse of political grievances in 
their social media discussions (Van San 2015). This idea of grievances discourse 
manifesting in a prominent way in the context of young Muslims is echoed, for example, 
by the Muslim life coordinator and Chaplain at Princeton University, Imam Sohaib Sultan. 
He claims in his article that responding to the challenge posed by violent extremist groups, 
college campuses need to engage in a variety of efforts including counseling and 
mentoring, in addition to addressing the social and political problems in the most effective 
way.28 In the light of the research results of this study, the development of best practices in 
radicalization prevention should engage youth in a broad manner. This could include for 
instance different kind of non-governmental initiatives providing platforms for the youth to 
advance the issues (be it political or social) which they find the most meaningful. 
When addressing the notion of Political grievances, some academics have argued that there 
aren’t too many studies focusing on the interplay between these grievances and domestic 
radicalization (Wilkinson & Gregory; Ranstorp 2010, 3). However, the exception in the 
Finnish context is the study of Anssi Kullberg (2011, 289–290). He argues that the jihadist 
propaganda, which opposes Islam with the West, creates whole new discourses of 
grievances in the context of Finland. Moreover, the polarizing situation will only worsen 
by stigmatizing, demonizing and generalizing the messengers of this kind of propaganda.  
                                               
28 How to speak with young Muslims about ISIS, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/imam-sohaib-
sultan/post_9915_b_7979594.html  (accessed 25 Oct, 2015) 
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Kullberg argues that preventive measures over radicalization in the society need to be 
carefully considered. Overreactions, such as increasing surveillance, collective 
punishments and security hysteria will only endanger the functionality of an open society 
and enhance the mainstreaming of radical approaches. Instead the focus needs to be placed 
on preventive matters and on encouraging open discussion. Kullberg stresses the 
importance  of  a  sense  of  proportion  which  will  develop  by  fostering  the  diversity  of  
opinions (Kullberg 2011, 290; 294–295). Similar acknowledgements have been made by 
the research participants of this study. They argue that a comprehensive emphasis needs to 
be focused on preventive actions engaging the society as a whole, including the youth, 
their  parents  and  families,  the  authorities,  the  schools,  the  religious  leaders,  the  Muslim  
communities, and the police. 
   
5.3 Discussing the findings and further research 
This  thesis  has  contributed  in  the  overall  field  of  radicalization  studies  by  providing  the  
Finnish Muslim opinion-leaders’, the imams’ and other influential Muslims’, impressions 
about the current debate on radicalization. For the first time these issues have been 
addressed from the points of view of the Muslims themselves within the Finnish societal 
context by conducting a thematic research interview. Because similar studies have not been 
conducted within the Finnish scope of radicalization research, it is impossible to compare 
the results with any contextually relevant study.  
However, when compared to the global radicalization research, the findings of this thesis 
especially are noteworthy, because they provide new knowledge on a context-specific 
group of people previously unstudied from this point of view. When examined in contrast 
with previous radicalization studies, it is exceptionally noticeable how two elements in 
particular stand out in this research compared to the overall research findings of the field. 
In the light of the research results of this study, it can be stated that both the Political 
grievances and the influence of the media are key elements contributing to the 
radicalization process within the Helsinki metropolitan area’s Muslim communities. Hence 
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this thesis claims that these two elements are important factors in the domestic 
radicalization processes, and need to be addressed when designing any preventive actions.  
This study was able to assess only a relatively small amount of possible research 
participants, and hence it has opened up a platform for future research. More studies should 
be conducted within the Finnish Muslim communities in order to reach broader opinion-
focused research results and thus provide insights of the actual points of view of the 
community. These kinds of studies are justifiable for many reasons. Firstly, according to 
the findings of this Master’s thesis, the influence of the media seems to be remarkably 
significant in maintaining the radicalization phenomenon within the Helsinki metropolitan 
area’s Muslim communities. If the indicative assumption based on the analysis of this 
research is correct, it implies that the media currently contributes in enhancing social 
exclusion by creating polarization within the society. It is obvious that more research needs 
to be focused on this issue in order to contribute to its prevention.  
As the development of the radicalization phenomenon within the Finnish society is still in 
process and the future countering and preventive measures are currently being formed, 
studies on the possible consequences what these kind of counter-terrorism and counter-
radicalization initiatives might have for the Muslim communities need to be undertaken. 
These measures can create a hostile atmosphere of suspicion towards the Muslim 
community;  place  the  Muslims  under  the  label  of  a  Suspect Community, if not properly 
executed. The importance of this kind of research is justified when comparing to the 
broader European context. Orla Lynch argues in her article British Muslim youth: 
radicalisation, terrorism and the construction of the “other” (2013) that In Europe, ever 
since the 9/11, the Muslim youth have been targeted by increasing generalizations and 
suspicions  concerning  for  example  their  perceived  lack  of  loyalty  to  the  country  of  
citizenship/residence, which has made them the number one reason for new policy making 
and state intervention, at the same time creating an image of the Muslim youth as a 
national security concern. (Lynch 2013, 257) 
Initially, my aim was to introduce this issue already within the research agenda of this 
thesis. However, even though one of the study respondents expressed his concern on the 
above mentioned matters, the development of the radicalization phenomenon and its 
Finnish counter policies is still an ongoing process and hence it is impossible to study its 
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effects  on  the  Muslim  community  at  this  stage.  Hopefully  the  preventing  actions  will  
succeed without producing any kind of Suspect Communities as a by-product.   
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7 APPENDIXES  
7.1 Glossary  
Islamism (vs. Islam): Political ideology, which is based on religion (Islam) / Collection of 
political ideas using a religious (Islamic) discourse and vocabulary which is used to justify 
the political actions and goals (Juha Saarinen) 
Jihad: Mainstream Muslims make a distinction between the greater jihad (striving for self-
improvement) and the lesser jihad (armed struggle in the path of God), whereas violent 
radical Salafis regard armed struggle as the only true jihad and as a personal religious 
obligation (Rabasa and Benard 2014, 32)  
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Jihadism: Political ideology / Violent form of Islamist political activism used for 
practicing jihad (war with religious justification) (Juha Saarinen) 
Global Jihadism: A form of jihadism which is rhetorically (and usually also operationally) 
focused on Western countries (Juha Saarinen) 
Foreign Fighter: A person who has travelled to conflict  zone and takes part  in an armed 
revolt, but who doesn’t have the citizenship of the country where the conflict takes place, 
and doesn’t have close ethnic relation or relatives with the conflict parties, nor does he/she 
belong to a military organization (Thomas Hegghammer) 
Salafi: A member of a strictly orthodox Sunni Muslim sect advocating a return to the early 
Islam of the Koran and Sunna (Oxford Dictionaries) 
Terrorism: The unofficial or unauthorized use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit 
of political aims (Oxford Dictionaries) 
Umma: The whole community of Muslims bound together by ties of religion (Oxford 
Dictionaries) 
 
7.2 Interview themes and questions  
1. Radicalization – what’s it all about? 
-  what do you think about this phenomenon/ how do you understand it/ how would 
you define radicalization (in the Islamic context)? 
- what causes radicalization/ why is there such a phenomenon? (from your point of 
view) 
- how does it show in the community/how would you recognize a radicalized person? 
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- which kind of challenges or opportunities are involved when talking about this 
phenomenon? 
 
 
2. The role of society and (religious) communities in dealing with radicalization 
- how should this matter be discussed in the Muslim communities/ mosques? 
- how should this matter be preached at the mosque/ have you included it in your 
sermon? 
- how should this matter be addressed in your community? 
- what has been done already? 
- are there people in your networks who have left to conflict zone/Syria/Iraq? 
- what is the role of imams/ religious leaders in this phenomenon?  
- can you influence it somehow? 
- how could particularly a religious leader contribute in dealing with this issue? 
- how should the society react to this matter? 
- what should be the societies role in dealing with this issue? 
- what do you think about the cooperation between authorities and Muslim 
communities in preventing violent radicalization? 
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3. The role of media and public discussion 
- the radicalization of young people has been discussed in the media, have you 
followed the discussion? 
- what do you think about this discussion? 
- in your opinion, has the attitude towards Islam and Muslims changed in the Finnish 
society? 
- how does it show in your community/mosque? 
- have you discussed this in your community? 
- what could be done about this matter? 
 
 
